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[1663] 
Secrets, Lies, and Lessons from the Theranos 
Scandal 
LAUREN ROGAL† 
Theranos, Inc., the unicorn startup blood-testing corporation, was ultimately laid low by a former 
employee whistleblower. The experience of that whistleblower during and after her employment 
illuminates detrimental secrecy practices within the startup sector, as well as legal and practical 
barriers to corporate accountability. Theranos sought to avoid exposure by cultivating an 
environment of secrecy and intimidation, and by aggressively extracting and enforcing non-
disclosure agreements. The legal landscape for whistleblowers facilitated this strategy: while 
whistleblowing employees enjoyed certain protections under anti-retaliation statutes, trade 
secrets statutes, and common law contract principles, these protections were neither readily 
accessible nor certain. This Article critically examines the contours and ambiguities of those legal 
frameworks, using the Theranos case study, and offers observations on the need for a harmonized 
public policy to facilitate private sector whistleblowing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) have been making headlines. The 
#MeToo movement revealed a pattern of corporations extracting NDAs from 
sexual misconduct victims, effectively shielding the perpetrators, and 
perpetuating their behavior.1 Former President Donald Trump notoriously 
required NDAs from employees at the Trump Organization and his presidential 
campaign.2 Long an unquestioned staple of corporate legal risk management, 
NDAs have acquired a dubious reputation for concealing information that would 
be in the public interest to disseminate. 
The case of Theranos, Inc., a blood-testing startup once valued at $9 
billion,3 invites critical assessment of NDAs and other mechanisms that curtail 
whistleblowing. Theranos ultimately imploded in a wave of headlines and 
indictments charging that the company fraudulently marketed diagnostic 
technology that it knew to be defective and unreliable. At its height, Theranos 
had over 800 employees,4 representing the best and brightest of Silicon Valley.5 
From this sophisticated and professionally mobile staff, precious few 
whistleblowers emerged. By the time a young woman named Erika Cheung 
alerted regulators in 2015, Theranos had already exposed thousands of 
consumers to the risk of faulty blood tests and wasted millions in investor 
money.6 
To prevent exposure by its workforce, Theranos’s founder and Chief 
Executive Officer Elizabeth Holmes deployed two main strategies. First, she 
cultivated an environment of secrecy and intimidation.7 Staff were 
systematically isolated, monitored, and threatened or fired for questioning 
company practices.8 Second, the company aggressively extracted and enforced 
NDAs, threatening employees with crushing liability for revealing company 
 
 1. Heather Tucker, USA Gymnastics Says It Will Not Fine McKayla Maroney if She Speaks Out Against 
Larry Nassar, USA TODAY (Jan. 16, 2018, 10:40 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/olympics/ 
2018/01/16/usa-gymnastics-mckayla-maroney-larry-nassar/1039025001/; Ronan Farrow, Harvey Weinstein’s 
Secret Settlements, NEW YORKER (Nov. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/C6GP-KEFM; Emily Steel & Michael S. 
Schmidt, Bill O’Reilly Settled New Harassment Claim, Then Fox Renewed His Contract, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/21/business/media/bill-oreilly-sexual-harassment.html. 
 2. Haven Orecchio-Egresitz, How Trump Uses Money, Non-Disclosure Agreements, and Intimidation to 
Muzzle the People Close to Him, BUS. INSIDER (June 18, 2020, 12:16 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/ 
how-trump-non-disclosure-agreements-intimidation-silence-mary-trump-book-2020-6; Scott Horsley, Sworn to 
Secrecy: Trump’s History of Using Nondisclosure Agreements, NPR (Mar. 19, 2018, 6:28 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/03/19/595025070/sworn-to-secrecy-trumps-history-of-using-nondisclosure-
agreements. 
 3. JOHN CARREYROU, BAD BLOOD: SECRETS AND LIES IN A SILICON VALLEY STARTUP 183 (2018). 
 4. Id. at 295. 
 5. See id. at 30 (describing the recruitment of a cadre of Apple employees); id. at 95 (describing the 
recruitment of employees from NASA and SpaceX). While many of its employees boasted lofty credentials, 
Theranos also practiced nepotism, hiring, and promoting family members and friends with scant qualifications. 
Id. at 98–99. 
 6. See infra Part IV. 
 7. See infra Part IV. 
 8. See infra Part IV. 
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secrets.9 Holmes’s approach, which perpetuated the deception in the short term, 
ultimately destroyed the company. There is much to be said about this culture, 
particularly the failures of corporate governance and the role of corporate 
lawyers who ought to have been fostering a culture of legal compliance.10 This 
Article, however, focuses on how Holmes’s approach was abetted by the law. 
While whistleblowers enjoyed certain rights and protections, these proved 
difficult for employees to access. 
The legal framework has improved considerably since 2015 due to the 
enactment of the Defend Trade Secrets Act and its explicit protections for 
whistleblowers.11 Yet as the Theranos story illuminates, practical barriers and 
uncertainties remain. The company’s implosion illustrates the need for enhanced 
and harmonized whistleblower laws that relieve workers of the burden of legal 
knowledge and effectively transmit notice of avenues for protected 
whistleblowing. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I relates the experience of Theranos 
whistleblower Erika Cheung. Part II explores the dynamics of corporate 
whistleblowing in the modern American workplace. Part III reviews the legal 
landscape for corporate whistleblowing and the rights and risks of the employer 
and employee. These include (1) anti-retaliation statutes, (2) trade secret 
protection laws, and (3) the contractual principles governing NDAs. Part IV sets 
Erika Cheung’s experience in the context of these discordant legal frameworks, 
discusses the inaccessibility and uncertainties that beset them, and offers 
principles for enhancing and harmonizing legal protections. 
 
I.  THE FALL OF THERANOS 
In September 2015, Erika Cheung composed an email to the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), which oversees diagnostic 
laboratories.12 She began by expressing trepidation: “I’ve been nervous to send 
or even write this letter. Theranos takes confidentiality and secrecy to an extreme 
level that has always made me scared to say anything . . . .”13 She then 
painstakingly detailed her misgivings about her former employer’s unorthodox 
(and, Cheung believed, illegal) laboratory protocols for its blood diagnostic 
technology.14 
 
 9. See infra Part IV. 
 10. See, e.g., G.S. Hans, How and Why Did It Go So Wrong?: Theranos as a Legal Ethics Case Study, 37 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 427 (2021); Brent T. Wilson, Theranos and the Tale of the Disappearing Board of Directors, 
63-APR ADVOC. (IDAHO) 10 (2020). 
 11. 18 U.S.C. § 1833. 
 12. CARREYROU, supra note 3, at 281. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
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Cheung had been a freshly minted graduate of Berkeley’s molecular and 
cell biology program when she took a position at Theranos in October 2013.15 
Assigned to perform quality control tests, she had had an unusually direct 
window into the struggles of Theranos’s blood-testing technology.16 The devices 
simply could not deliver reliable, replicable results.17 Even more unsettlingly, 
Cheung had observed that unfavorable quality control test results were deleted 
as anomalous.18 Worst of all, this had all happened while Theranos was installing 
its technology in Walgreens pharmacies, exposing the public to the risk of false 
blood test results.19 
Theranos had developed tactics to prevent exposure by concerned 
employees like Cheung. Secrecy and fear permeated the company culture.20 
Employee teams were physically and intellectually segregated by means of 
partitions, fingerprint scanners, and strict rules regarding the sharing of 
information among teams.21 These communication barriers, while impediments 
to scientific progress, successfully obscured employees’ full picture of Theranos 
operations.22 Due to her position in quality control, Cheung was among the few 
employees with full knowledge of the device failures. 
The company also monitored, suppressed, and punished dissenting 
voices.23 One such voice was that of Tyler Shultz, a friend of Cheung’s and the 
grandson of Theranos director and former Secretary of State George Shultz. 
When Shultz raised his concerns about Theranos’s quality control testing 
directly with executives, he received false assurances and a scathing rebuke from 
Theranos second-in-command Sunny Balwani.24 Balwani then reviewed the 
company’s email traffic and traced Shultz’s information to Cheung, whom he 
berated and tacitly threatened with termination.25 Shultz and Cheung were lucky: 
other employees who questioned company practices had been quickly fired.26 
 
 15. Taylor Dunn, Victoria Thompson & Rebecca Jarvis, Theranos Whistleblowers Filed Complaints Out 
of Fear of Patients’ Health: ‘It Started to Eat Me Up Inside’: ‘The Dropout’ Episode 4, ABC NEWS (Mar. 13, 
2019, 9:56 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Business/theranos-whistleblowers-filed-complaints-fear-patients-
health-started/story?id=61030212. 
 16. Id.; CARREYROU, supra note 3, at 188. 
 17. Dunn et al., supra note 15; CARREYROU, supra note 3, at 188–90. 
 18. Dunn et al., supra note 15; CARREYROU, supra note 3, at 187–90. 
 19. Dunn et al., supra note 15. 
 20. Id.; CARREYROU, supra note 3, at 77 (describing employees’ fear of Balwani); id. at 116 (citing a fired 
employee’s email to Holmes and Balwani, in which she denounced “a work environment where people hide 
things from you out of fear”). 
 21. CARREYROU, supra note 3, at 296–97. 
 22. Id. at 20, 32, 37, 142–43. 
 23. Id. at 297 (describing the monitoring of emails and internet browser histories); id. at 164 (describing 
how employees who raised concerns were marginalized or fired). 
 24. Id. at 191–94 (describing how Shultz was reassured first by Holmes and scientist Daniel Young); id. at 
196 (describing how Balwani “belittled everything from [Shultz]’s grasp of statistics to his knowledge of 
laboratory science”). 
 25. Id. at 198 (citing Balwani’s parting words as “[y]ou need to tell me if you want to work here or not”). 
 26. See id. at 48–51 (describing the firing of a sales executive and general counsel for warning board 
members about the company’s unrealistic revenue projections); id. at 114–16 (describing how a scientist was 
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The Chief Financial Officer had been terminated on the spot when he questioned 
the soundness of financial projections given to investors.27 
Finally, Theranos relied on the aggressive use and enforcement of NDAs. 
Cheung signed an NDA before she even interviewed with Theranos,28 and 
another when she resigned.29 The final straw had been an unsuccessful joint 
attempt with Tyler Shultz to present his grandfather with their misgivings.30 The 
next day, Cheung submitted her resignation.31 The colleague who processed her 
resignation demanded a fresh NDA, searched her backpack, and warned her 
against posting anything about Theranos on online forums.32 This appears to 
have been typical employee exit protocol. When one departing employee refused 
to sign an NDA, Balwani ordered Theranos security officers to block his exit 
from the property.33 When that failed, Balwani called the police to report the 
man for theft, telling officers that the employee “stole property in his mind.”34 
Theranos outsourced NDA enforcement to the law firm of Boies Schiller 
Flexner LLP, where famed litigator David Boies often personally oversaw 
Theranos matters.35 Cheung encountered Boies Schiller after Tyler Shultz 
convinced her to speak with Wall Street Journal reporter John Carreyrou, who 
was investigating Theranos. Shortly thereafter, Cheung received a letter from 
Boies Schiller accusing her of revealing Theranos trade secrets and demanding 
that she submit to an “interview” with Boies Schiller attorneys.36 Because the 
letter was addressed to the home of a friend where Cheung was staying 
temporarily, she concluded that Boies Schiller agents must have followed her.37 
Boies Schiller was similarly aggressive in its confrontation of Carreyrou, Shultz, 
and another Journal source pseudonymously known as “Alan Beam.”38 
Months later, Cheung located a lawyer who provided a free consultation.39 
The attorney informed her that she could notify CMS about Theranos’s 
 
threatened with termination for raising lab protocol concerns and fired shortly thereafter for calling attention to 
billing issues). 
 27. Id. at 8. 
 28. Rick Berke, Interview: Theranos Whistleblower Erika Cheung Thinks Elizabeth Holmes Should Spend 
Years in Prison, KQED (May 2, 2019), https://www.kqed.org/science/1941045/interview-theranos-
whistleblower-erika-cheung-thinks-elizabeth-holmes-should-spend-years-in-prison. 
 29. CARREYROU, supra note 3, at 200. 
 30. Id. at 199. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 200. 
 33. Id. at 107. 
 34. Id. at 108. 
 35. Id. at 201. 
 36. Id. at 255–56. 
 37. Id. at 255. 
 38. Id. at 241–46 (relating a confrontation between Tyler Shultz and two Boies Schiller attorneys in his 
grandfather’s home); id. at 254 (describing the behavior of Boies Schiller attorneys during a meeting with 
Carreyrou); id. at 266 (describing Boies Schiller’s threats against Alan Beam). 
 39. Meera Jagannathan, Theranos Whistleblower: How to Prevent Another $600M Silicon Valley Disaster, 
MARKETWATCH (May 17, 2019, 5:33 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/theranos-whistleblower-i-
was-so-paranoid-about-theranos-and-them-spying-on-me-2019-05-15. 
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regulatory noncompliance without legal exposure. The email triggered the 
avalanche that would ultimately destroy Theranos. Regulators descended within 
days,40 leading to the closure of Theranos’s laboratories,41 charges by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission,42 and federal indictments for wire fraud 
against Theranos founder and Chief Executive Officer Elizabeth Holmes and her 
deputy Balwani.43 
The Theranos story is singular in its sensational details, but it nevertheless 
echoes familiar themes and provides generalizable lessons. While most 
companies are not built entirely on fraudulent claims, Silicon Valley startups are 
famous for hyping “vaporware” products that are still under development and 
often never materialize.44 Many observers recognized the seeds of Theranos’s 
fall in the tech industry’s pervasive “fake it till you make it” mentality.45 
Theranos’s fanatical secrecy was also a more extreme version of common 
Silicon Valley practices; Holmes deliberately patterned her management after 
the famously secrecy-obsessed Steve Jobs.46 Moreover, as the next Part 
explores, the intimidation and suppression of whistleblowers at Theranos shares 
much with the rest of the American workplace. 
II.  WHISTLEBLOWING IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 
Erika Cheung’s experience aligns with much of the empirical research into 
corporate whistleblowing. Approximately half of American private sector 
employees claim to have personally witnessed misconduct in their workplace.47 
Among the most common transgressions are health violations and lying to 
external stakeholders.48 This Part describes the data on how and when employees 
operate as a warning system for company problems. 
 
 40. CARREYROU, supra note 3, at 282. 
 41. Id. at 289. 
 42. Id. at 296. 
 43.  Indictment, United States v. Holmes, No. 5:18-CR-00258-EJD, 2020 WL 666563 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 
2020), 2018 WL 3216817. 
 44. Beware of Vaporware: Product Hype and the Securities Fraud Liability of High-Tech Companies, 8 
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1–2 (1994). 
 45. CARREYROU, supra note 3, at 296; Erin Griffith, Theranos and Silicon Valley’s ‘Fake It Till You Make 
It’ Culture, WIRED (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/theranos-and-silicon-valleys-fake-it-till-you-
make-it-culture/; Howard Tullman, Why Fake It Till You Make It Is Finished, INC. (Mar. 14, 2019), 
https://www.inc.com/howard-tullman/why-fake-it-til-you-make-it-is-finished.html. 
 46. CARREYROU, supra note 3, at 151 (one former Apple employee was unperturbed by Theranos’s secrecy 
practices, as Apple had been similar); see also Kif Leswing, Apple Lawsuit Shows the Company’s Extreme Focus 
on Secrecy, CNBC (Mar. 11, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/11/apple-lawsuit-shows-the-companys-
extreme-focus-on-secrecy.html (describing Apple’s need-to-know system where employees are kept in the dark 
about other parts of their project). 
 47. ETHICS & COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE, THE STATE OF ETHICS & COMPLIANCE IN THE WORKPLACE 6 
(2018), https://43wli92bfqd835mbif2ms9qz-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/ 
GBES2018-Final.pdf. This may include non-criminal conduct that violates company policies or professional 
ethics. This figure has hovered around 50% consistently since 2000. Id. 
 48. Id. 
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A large majority of employees who witness misconduct say that they report 
it, most often to a supervisor.49 Employees are more likely to report wrongdoing 
if they feel institutionally empowered, financially secure, and supported by 
social and professional networks.50 Managers have a relatively high reporting 
rate due to their sense of agency within the company and confidence that the 
report will have an impact.51 Unionized employees, who enjoy the protection of 
their collective bargaining contracts and fellowship of other members, also 
report at high rates.52 Employees who do not report misconduct cite several 
reasons, including the belief that the report would fall on deaf ears (59%), fear 
of retaliation (46%), inability to report anonymously (39%), and the belief that 
someone else would report in lieu of them (24%).53 These data sets do not 
disaggregate according to whether the malefactor is in a managerial or non-
managerial role, but it is reasonable to surmise that employees are more reluctant 
to report their supervisors than their subordinates or employees at their level of 
seniority. 
The whistleblowing rate plummets in companies with a weak ethical 
culture.54 The Ethics and Compliance Institute defines company culture as “the 
shared understanding of what really matters in an organization, and the way 
things really get done”—in short, the practices behind the window-dressing.55 
In addition to lower reporting rates, weak ethical cultures are characterized by 
much higher rates of observed misconduct, higher retaliation rates, and higher 
percentages of employees reporting that they experienced pressure to 
compromise their ethical standards.56 Troublingly, a full 40% of the American 
workforce reported in 2017 that their company’s ethical culture was weak or 
weak-leaning.57 Sixteen percent of employees reported experiencing pressure to 
compromise their ethical or professional standards, and 63% believe that their 
company rewards unethical behavior.58 Forty-four percent of reporters say they 
experienced retaliation in 2017, which is double the percentage in 2013.59 The 
spike in this figure may in part reflect greater sensitivity to the appropriate 
handling of whistleblower reports. 
 
 49. Id. at 7. 
 50. ETHICS RES. CTR., INSIDE THE MIND OF A WHISTLEBLOWER: A SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF THE 2011 
NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY 2 (2012), https://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2012/05/inside-the-mind-of-a-whistleblower-NBES.pdf. 
 51. Id. at 6. 
 52. Id. at 7. 
 53. Id. at 5. 
 54. ETHICS & COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE, supra note 47, at 10 (finding that 83% observed misconduct and 
52% reported it). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 8. 
 59. Id. at 9. 
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External whistleblowing is rare in corporate America.60 According to a 
2011 survey, only 18% of whistleblowers ever reported outside the company, 
and 84% of those external whistleblowers attempted to report internally first.61 
When asked what would motivate them to report externally, employees cited the 
gravity and persistence of the misconduct, the likelihood that remaining silent 
would result in harm to people or the environment, and the company’s failure to 
redress their internal complaint.62 A minority cited the potential for monetary 
reward,63 which certain public agencies offer.64 While a weak ethical culture 
deters internal reports, it correlates to higher levels of external reporting.65 
Employees are generally better positioned to identify corporate 
malfeasance than resource-strapped regulators or other external stakeholders. 
Overwhelmingly, they prefer to counteract such misconduct through internal 
channels and are strongly disinclined to reveal their observations to external 
parties. This dynamic is heavily informed by the balance of risks to themselves 
versus others, which in turn is shaped by company culture, the employee’s 
position in the company, and the employee’s understanding of their legal rights. 
Part III describes the legal framework for whistleblowers. 
III.  THE WHISTLEBLOWER LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
A whistleblower’s rights, and a company’s response, are governed by three 
main areas of law. First, state laws generally prohibit employers from retaliating 
against whistleblowers through termination, demotion, or other adverse action. 
In certain circumstances, federal law may also prohibit such retaliation. On the 
other hand, the law also generally gives companies the right to seek injunctive 
and monetary relief if the employee has misappropriated its trade secrets, or file 
suit for breach of contract if an employee has violated an NDA. This Part 
explores the contours of and tensions between the rights of employer and 
whistleblower. 
A. ANTIRETALIATION LAWS 
Employment in the United States is presumed to be at-will unless otherwise 
provided by law or private contract.66 Nevertheless, most jurisdictions have long 
recognized a common law tort of wrongful discharge when an employee is 
 
 60. Jonathan L. Awner & Denise Dickins, Will There Be Whistleblowers?, 34 REGULATION, Summer 2011, 
at 36, 38–39. 
 61. ETHICS RES. CTR., supra note 50, at 2. 
 62. Id. at 14–15. 
 63. Id. at 14. 
 64. For example, see the description of whistleblower rewards provided by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
 65. ETHICS RES. CTR., supra note 50, at 13. 
 66. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT § 2.01 (AM. L. INST. 2015). For example, statutory 
exceptions to at-will employment prevent the termination of employees based on their protected characteristics, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), their request for family or medical leave, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2), or labor 
organization activities, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4).  
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terminated for engaging in activities protected by “well-established public 
policy.”67 Protected activities include refusing to commit a wrongful act, 
requesting a legally mandated employment benefit in good faith, and reporting 
“conduct that the employee reasonably and in good faith believes violates a law 
or an established principle of a professional or occupational code of conduct 
protective of the public interest.”68 The cause of action also typically covers 
constructive discharge, where an employer knowingly creates working 
conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee would resign, and, in some 
states, demotions and other disciplinary acts.69 
In the 1980s states began codifying these protections into whistleblower 
non-retaliation statutes.70 Today, there is considerable variation in these laws, 
both with respect to the coverage provided and the burden placed on 
whistleblowers to comply with specific dictates in their reporting. Certain 
federal statutes also provide whistleblower protections against retaliation, 
though the availability and level of protection is uneven—reports of securities 
or tax fraud trigger substantial protections and potential rewards,71 while 
reporters to other agencies may not enjoy protection from retaliation at all.72 
1. State Whistleblower Protections 
Every state has at least one whistleblower protection statute forbidding 
retaliation against employees who report misconduct, but the contours of these 
laws vary significantly. The overall landscape was described by one 
commentator as “murky, piecemeal, disorganized, and [variable] from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.”73 For example, Massachusetts offers blanket 
protection only to public sector workers,74 while next door, Rhode Island covers 
not only private sector employees but also independent contractors.75 State laws 
 
 67. Id. § 5.01; Gerard Sinzdak, Comment, An Analysis of Current Whistleblower Laws: Defending a More 
Flexible Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1633, 1643 (2008). 
 68. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT § 5.02(a), (c), (e). 
 69. Id. § 5.01 cmt. c.; Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022, 1028–29 (Cal. 1994); Balmer v. 
Hawkeye Steel, 604 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Iowa 2000); Gormley v. Coca-Cola Enters., 109 P.3d 280, 282–83 (N.M. 
2005); Anderson v. First Century Fed. Credit Union, 738 N.W.2d 40, 47 (S.D. 2007). 
 70. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Timothy A. Haley, Governance of the Workplace: The Contemporary 
Regime of Individual Contract, 28 COMPAR. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 313, 342 (2007). 
 71. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b) (authorizing rewards to securities whistleblowers), § 78u-6(h) (prohibiting 
retaliation against whistleblowers); I.R.C. § 7623(a) (2019) (authorizing rewards to tax whistleblowers), 
§ 7623(d) (protecting whistleblowers to the IRS from retaliation). 
 72. For example, private sector whistleblowers do not have protection from retaliation under the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–55. 
 73. Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and the Implications of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029, 1049 (2004). 
 74. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 185(a)(2) (2021). A bill proposed in 2019 would expand coverage to 
private sector employees. S.B. 1100, 191st Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2019). While excluded from the general 
whistleblower statute, certain private sector employees may find protection under subject matter-specific 
legislation. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS. Ch. 149, § 187(b) (forbidding retaliation against whistleblower 
employees of health care facilities).  
 75. 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-50-2(1) (2020). 
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also vary significantly with respect to (1) whether they cover disclosures of all 
legal violations, a subset of legal violations, suspected violations, or threats to 
public welfare that do not violate the law; (2) whether they protect internal 
whistleblowing or only reports to public authorities;76 (3) whether they prohibit 
“pretaliation” efforts to prevent whistleblowing; (4) whether an employee must 
exhaust internal reporting mechanisms to enjoy protection; (5) whether 
employers are required to alert employees to their rights; and (6) the scope of 
remedies available. 
This diversity can perhaps best be illustrated by a comparison between 
California’s relatively pro-whistleblower framework and New York’s anemic 
protections. California offers broad coverage, expansive remedies, and 
mandatory notice to employees of whistleblower rights. New York is a minefield 
for whistleblowers, only protecting reports of actual legal violations and 
requiring exhaustion of internal remedies without fully protecting internal 
reports. 
a. Pro-Whistleblower Statute: California 
California’s whistleblower protection statute is unusually robust in most 
respects. It protects private and public employees who report, or testify before a 
public body, information they reasonably believe to reveal a violation of a 
federal, state, or local law or regulation.77 The protection covers reports to 
supervisors, other employees with the power to investigate or correct the 
violation, and any government agency.78 Employers may not adopt or implement 
any policy that prohibits employees from making such a report, and may not 
retaliate against any employee whom the employer believes has made a report 
or anticipates might make a report in the future.79 
California law provides speedy redress to whistleblowers. Courts must 
provide appropriate injunctive relief upon a showing of reasonable cause to 
believe that a violation of the whistleblower law has occurred.80 Short of this 
showing, courts must determine whether an injunction is “just and proper,” 
considering the harm done to the employee as well as the “chilling effect on 
other employees asserting their rights” under the whistleblower law.81 These are 
relatively low thresholds for preliminary injunctive relief, which typically 
requires the complainant to show a likelihood of prevailing on the merits and of 
 
 76. Enron whistleblower Sherron Watkins did not enjoy whistleblower protection under Texas law because 
she reported accounting misconduct only to CEO Kenneth Lay and not to law enforcement. Sinzdak, supra note 
67, at 1633. 
 77. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1102.5(a)–(b), 1106 (West 2021) (defining “employee” to include without 
limitation public sector employees). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. § 1102.62(c). 
 81. Id. § 1102.62(a)–(b). 
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irreparable harm.82 Moreover, the injunction in whistleblower cases may not be 
stayed pending appeal.83 California also imposes criminal liability on employers 
that trample whistleblower rights. Violation of the statute is a misdemeanor 
punishable by a fine of up to $5,000 for a corporation, or imprisonment of up to 
one year and a fine of up to $1,000 for an individual.84 
California law actively seeks to raise public awareness of whistleblower 
rights and facilitate reports of wrongdoing. The Attorney General must maintain 
a whistleblower hotline and refer calls to the appropriate government authority.85 
This relieves whistleblowers of the need to identify the appropriate recipient for 
their report. While the law does not expressly permit anonymous reporting, it 
promises confidentiality during the “initial review” of the complaint.86 
Employers must also “prominently display in lettering larger than size 14 point 
type a list of employees’ rights and responsibilities under the whistleblower 
laws, including the telephone number of the whistleblower hotline.”87 
b. Pro-Employer Statute: New York 
New York offers comparatively weak protections to private sector 
whistleblowers.88 Where California covers any disclosure that the whistleblower 
reasonably believed revealed a violation of law, New York requires an actual 
violation of a “law, rule or regulation which . . . creates and presents a 
substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety, or which constitutes 
health care fraud.”89 Moreover, disclosures are only protected if the employee 
previously reported the violation internally and provided the company with “a 
reasonable opportunity” to remedy the offending activity, policy, or practice.90 
New York employers may not take adverse action against an employee 
who discloses or “threatens to disclose” information under the statute.91 The 
term “threatens” has been construed narrowly to deny protection to an employee 
who merely expressed concern about a potential legal violation to the 
employer.92 This creates a conundrum for whistleblowers: the statute requires 
employees to report the violation internally and provide an opportunity to cure, 
but the act of doing so may not be protected conduct. An employee who 
 
 82. See Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 
 83. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.62(e). 
 84. Id. § 1103. 
 85. Id. § 1102.7(a)–(b). 
 86. Id. § 1102.7(c). 
 87. Id. § 1102.8(a). 
 88. An amendment was introduced in 2019 to strengthen the private sector whistleblower laws but has not 
been enacted. A.B. 7384, 2019 Leg., 243rd Sess. (N.Y. 2019). A separate statute protects civil servant 
whistleblowers. See N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 75-b (McKinney 2021). 
 89. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(a)–(c) (McKinney 2021). 
 90. Id. § 740(3). This doesn’t apply to situations where the employee gives information or testifies to a 
public body already conducting an investigation. Id. § 740(2)(b). 
 91. Id. § 740(2)(a). 
 92. Roach v. Comput. Ass’n Int’l, Inc., 638 N.Y.S.2d 699, 700 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (stating that the statute’s 
“scope cannot be expanded to provide a remedy to employees who merely allege perceived or implied threats”).  
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complies with the law’s command to report the violation internally may 
therefore have no recourse if the report triggers her dismissal. The inexorable 
conclusion is that the employee must include a threat to disclose when raising 
the violation with the employer. This exposes the employee to an even higher 
risk of retaliation if it turns out that the company did not actually violate the law. 
Moreover, unlike California, New York does not require any notice to 
employees of their rights as whistleblowers. 
New York law is also less favorable for whistleblowers with respect to 
remedies. A prevailing complainant may receive an injunction, reinstatement, 
compensatory relief, and payment of all costs and attorneys’ fees.93 The 
employer is entitled to costs and attorneys’ fees if the court determines that the 
claim was “without basis in fact or law.”94 
As the comparison between California and New York illustrates, corporate 
whistleblowers face very different legal shields and hurdles depending on their 
jurisdiction. In addition to the general whistleblower protection statute, many 
states have additional non-retaliation provisions for specific offenses.95 Such 
supplementary provisions, while protective, add an additional layer of potential 
uncertainty and confusion to employees seeking to determine their rights. 
2. Federal Whistleblower Protections 
Federal law offers piecemeal protection to private sector whistleblowers, 
the strength of which depends on the subject matter.96 Erika Cheung, for 
example, reported violations of clinical laboratory regulations, which provide 
virtually no whistleblower protection. In contrast, Theranos executives were 
ultimately indicted for defrauding investors, an area of law that offers relatively 
strong whistleblower protection. 
a. Weak Whistleblower Protections: Clinical Laboratory Laws 
 The Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 198897 (CLIA) 
mandates certification of and quality standards for clinical laboratories that 
test human specimens.98 It is administered by the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services.99 Federal law provides no specific whistleblower 
 
 93. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(5). 
 94. Id. § 740(6). 
 95. For example, most states have enacted a false claims act that shields whistleblowers who report fraud 
against state-funded programs. State False Claims Act, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUC. FUND, 
https://www.taf.org/state-laws (last visited July 31, 2021). 
 96. A bill to harmonize and expand private sector whistleblower protections died in committee in 2012. 
H.R. 6409, 112th Cong. (2012). 
 97. Pub. L. No. 100–578. 
 98. 42 U.S.C. 263(a)-(b) (requiring certification), (f)(1) (requiring satisfaction of standards). 
 99. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA), 
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/CLIA (last visited July 31, 2021). 
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protection to laboratory employees who report CLIA violations.100 In certain 
circumstances, however, they may be covered by whistleblower protections 
under the False Claims Act (FCA). The FCA prohibits fraud against 
government programs, including Medicare and Medicaid. 101 CLIA 
violations may give rise to FCA violations in certain cases, such as if the 
laboratory deficiencies rendered the billed services medically worthless102 or 
if the laboratory falsely certified CLIA compliance as a condition of 
payment. 103 
Whistleblowers (called “relators”) may bring qui tam actions on behalf 
of the United States for violations of the FCA. 104 The government may opt 
to intervene and litigate the action, entitling the relator to an award of  
15–25% of the proceeds, as well as reasonable expenses and attorneys’ fees. 
105 If the government does not intervene, the relator is entitled to  
25–30% of the proceeds, as well as reasonable expenses and attorneys’ fees. 
106 Since 2009, the FCA has also entitled qui tam whistleblowers to “all relief 
necessary to make [the whistleblower] whole,” if the whistleblower is 
discharged, demoted, suspended, harassed, or otherwise discriminated 
against due to their (1) lawful acts done in furtherance of a qui tam action or 
(2) other efforts to stop violations of the FCA.107 Relief may include 
reinstatement, double back pay, interest on back pay, and compensation for 
any special damages.108 
In order to access the FCA’s protections, the whistleblower must show 
that they were engaged in FCA-protected activity and that the employer 
knew their activity was protected under the FCA.109 This presents a hurdle 
 
 100. U.S. Gov’t. Accountability Off., GAO-06-416, Clinical Lab Quality: CMS and Survey Organization 
Oversight Should be Strengthened 28 (2006). Legislation to protect laboratory whistleblowers was introduced 
in 2005 but died in committee. Clinical Laboratory Compliance Improvement Act of 2005, H.R. 686, 109th 
Cong. § 2 (2005). 
 101. 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1). 
 102. See Chesbrough v. VPA, P.C., 655 F.3d 461, 468 (6th Cir. 2011); U.S. ex rel. Lee v. SmithKline 
Beecham, Inc., 245 F.3d 1048, 1053–54 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 103. False certifications of legal compliance may create liability under the FCA when certification is a 
condition of receiving a government benefit. U.S. ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 
F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir. 1997); United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1266–67 (9th Cir. 1996). 
Whether CLIA compliance is a condition of Medicare payment is a contested issue. See United States ex rel. 
New Mexico v. Deming Hosp. Corp, 992 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1150 (D.N.M. 2013) (dismissing the FCA claim 
after finding that CLIA compliance is a condition of Medicare participation but not payment, and that CMS has 
administrative measures to address violations other than nonpayment); United States ex rel. Porter v. HCA 
Health Servs. of Okla., Inc., Civil Action No. 3:09-CV-0992, 2011 WL 4590791, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 
2011) (declining to dismiss the relator’s claim under a false certification theory). 
 104. 31 U.S.C. 3730(b)(1). 
 105. Id. 3730(d)(1). 
 106. Id. 3730(d)(2). 
 107. Id. 3730(h)(1). 
 108. Id. 3730(h)(2). 
 109. United States ex rel. Strubbe v. Crawford Cty. Mem. Hosp., 915 F.3d 1158, 1166 (8th Cir. 2019); 
Singletary v. Howard Univ., 939 F.3d 287, 293 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Fakorede v. Mid-South Heart Center, P.C., 
709 Fed.Appx. 787, 789 (6th Cir. 2017). 
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for whistleblowers who merely report regulatory violations.110 To be 
protected under the FCA, they must reasonably believe the regulatory 
noncompliance has or will amount to fraud against the government.111 
Moreover, they must put the employer on notice that their protected activity 
relates to the filing of false or fraudulent claims.112 A laboratory worker who 
simply identifies and reports CLIA violations without tying the issue to 
Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement is unlikely to receive FCA 
whistleblower protection.113  
b. Stronger Whistleblower Protection: Securities Laws 
Federal securities statutes contain comparatively robust whistleblower 
protections. Federal protection for employees who report suspected securities 
laws violations began with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”). 
Enacted in response to the Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals and the 
role of whistleblowers in unearthing them,114 Sarbanes-Oxley forbade public 
companies and their agents from retaliating against employees who report or 
testify about what they reasonably believe to be securities violations or other 
fraud against shareholders.115 Protected reports could be directed to any federal 
regulator or law enforcement agency, member or committee of Congress, or 
internal supervisor.116 The U.S. Supreme Court later held that the protection 
 
 110. See, e.g., Strubbe, 915 F.3d at 1167–68 (denying FCA whistleblower protection to hospital employees 
who complained about medical treatment and financial practices but did not give the hospital notice that its 
“behavior was fraudulent or potentially subjected it to FCA liability”). 
 111. Strubbe, 915 F.3d at 1167 (quoting Schuhardt v. Washington Univ., 390 F.3d 563, 567 (8th Cir. 2004)); 
Singletary, 939 F.3d at 296; Fakorede, 709 Fed. Appx. at 790. In Fakorede, a cardiologist’s expressed concern 
over misattributed expenses and reminded the employer that an audit should verify compliance with federal law. 
The Sixth Circuit upheld dismissal of the retaliation claim because the allegations did not support the conclusion 
that he understood the relationship between the FCA and other federal law, or that his activity was motivated by 
this connection. Id. 
 112. Strubbe at 1167–68. 
 113. See, e.g., United States ex rel. New Mexico v. Deming Hosp. Corp, 992 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1165 
(D.N.M. 2013) (dismissing the retaliation claim of a medical technologist who repeatedly reported CLIA 
violations because “nothing…suggests that she raised any concerns with Defendants regarding fraudulent 
billing, false claims, or any other activity that might be covered under the FCA. To the contrary, her statements 
to Defendants raised concerns about quality control, documentation, and CLIA violations; there is no reference 
to any statements regarding fraudulent claims or Medicare billing practices.”) In contrast, the Singletary 
retaliation claim survived a motion to dismiss because the laboratory worker specifically told her employer that 
lab conditions violated the conditions of its federal grant funding and urged her employer not to submit false 
certification to the funding agency. Singletary, 939 F.3d at 301–302. 
 114. Enron’s vice president for corporate development blew the whistle internally to the CEO. Text of Letter 
to Enron’s Chairman After Departure of Chief Executive, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2002), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/16/business/text-of-letter-to-enron-s-chairman-after-departure-of-chief-
executive.html. WorldCom’s internal auditor blew the whistle about accounting fraud to the company’s board 
of directors. Anitha Reddy, WorldCom Executive Sought Audit Delay, WASH. POST (July 9, 2002), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/2002/07/09/worldcom-executive-sought-audit-
delay/685a340a-2eb4-4db1-9904-2aaf18756df3/. 
 115. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a). 
 116. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1). 
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from retaliation applied to independent contractors as well.117 Sarbanes-Oxley 
also required public companies to establish internal channels for whistleblowers 
to anonymously and confidentially report accounting and auditing concerns to 
the board of directors.118 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
(“Dodd-Frank”) enhanced whistleblower protections in the securities arena by 
(1) extending their reach to privately-held companies,119 (2) permitting 
anonymous and confidential reports to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC),120 (3) authorizing the SEC to enforce anti-retaliation provisions 
directly,121 and (4) mandating the payment of a bounty to whistleblowers who 
“voluntarily provided original information” to the SEC that led to sanctions of 
$1 million or more.122 The “original information” requirement prevents people 
from piggybacking on the original whistleblower’s report in order to claim the 
bounty, which amounts to 10–30% of the aggregate sanctions imposed on the 
company.123 
The SEC also promulgated Rule 21F-17, which forbids employers from 
attempting to undermine its whistleblower programs by contract, stating that 
“[n]o person may take any action to impede an individual from communicating 
directly with the Commission staff about a possible securities law violation, 
including enforcing, or threatening to enforce, a confidentiality 
agreement . . . with respect to such communications.”124 During the Obama 
administration, the SEC enforced this rule against a number of companies that 
sought to silence whistleblowers by contract. In one case, the SEC fined 
Anheuser-Busch InBev for executing a separation agreement that imposed 
confidentiality requirements and liquidated damages of $250,000 for any breach 
thereof.125 The confidentiality provisions did not expressly forbid 
communication with the regulator, but neither did it include a carve-out for 
whistleblowing.126 In 2014, the chief of the SEC Office of the Whistleblower 
threatened that, “if we find that kind of language, not only are we going to go to 
the companies, we are going to go after the lawyers who drafted it.”127 
 
 117. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429, 433 (2014). 
 118. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j–1(m)(4). 
 119. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (stating that “[n]o employer” may retaliate against whistleblowers). 
 120. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 922, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(d)(2)(A) 
(anonymity), (h)(2)(A) (confidentiality). 
 121. Sarbanes-Oxley provided only a private right of action. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1). 
 122. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(1), (b)(1). 
 123. Id. § 78u-6(b)(1). 
 124. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-17 (2020). 
 125. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV, Exchange Release Act No. 78957, at 24–27 (Sept. 28, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-78957.pdf. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Brian Mahoney, SEC Warns In-House Attys Against Whistleblower Contracts, LAW360 (Mar. 14, 
2014, 5:16 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/518815/sec-warns-in-house-attys-against-whistleblower-
contracts. 
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Both state and federal anti-retaliation laws are characterized by their 
variability. A company and employee might find themselves subject to multiple 
laws at the state and federal levels with different subject matter coverage, 
reporting protocol, and remedies. One common theme, however, is that 
regardless of the law at issue, whistleblowers seldom prevail in their retaliation 
claims.128 A 2013 study of state court decisions by Professor Nancy M. Modesitt 
found that employers succeeded the trial or administrative hearing level 93% of 
the time.129 On appeal, decisions favoring the employer were affirmed 81% of 
the time.130 Most often, courts deny whistleblowers relief for failure to show a 
causal connection between their protected activity and the adverse employment 
action.131 The record of Sarbanes-Oxley retaliation claims is equally dismal.132 
Professor Richard Moberly examined the outcomes of administrative decisions 
by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, finding that claimants 
prevailed less than 4% of the time.133 In their analysis of decisions, both 
Modesitt and Moberly found that decisionmakers tend to interpret whistleblower 
protections narrowly and favorably to employers.134 The paltry win rates are 
difficult to interpret, as they surely include unmeritorious claims and do not 
capture whether law has effectively deterred corporate retaliation.135 That said, 
the severity of the skew towards employers speaks discouragingly of the 
protective power of anti-retaliation laws. This landscape grows even more 
complex and uncertain when considered in conjunction with trade secrets 
doctrine, discussed in the following Subpart. 
B. PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS 
Legal protection of trade secrets arose during the Industrial Revolution. 
Preindustrial society protected commercially valuable knowledge through the 
guild system and informal custom.136 Large-scale manufacturing eroded those 
constraints, depersonalized production, and facilitated the unauthorized 
appropriation of trade knowledge.137 By the mid-1800s, courts generally 
recognized a property right in commercial know-how and a cause of action for 
 
 128. Nancy M. Modesitt, Why Whistleblowers Lose: An Empirical and Qualitative Analysis of State Court 
Cases, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 165, 181 (2013) (reviewing cases brought under state statute and the common law 
doctrine of wrongful discharge); Richard Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years 
Later, 64 S. CAR. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2012) (reviewing administrative decisions under SOX). 
 129. Modesitt, supra note 128, at 181. 
 130. Id. at 179. 
 131. Id. at 184. 
 132. Moberly, supra note 128, at 28–29. 
 133. Id. His first study showed a success rate of 3.6% from the statute’s enactment through mid-2005. His 
follow-up study showed that from 2005 to 2011, claimants only won 1.8% of cases decided by OSHA. Moberly 
partially attributed the low win rate to poor investigative practices and training at OSHA. Id. at 29–32. 
 134. Modesitt, supra note 128, at 189–92; Moberly, supra note 128, at 32–33. 
 135. Moberly, supra note 128, at 28. 
 136. Peter S. Menell, Tailoring a Public Policy Exception to Trade Secret Protection, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 
1, 11 (2017). 
 137. Id. at 12. 
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the misuse or theft of trade secrets.138 This has evolved into a complex web of 
state and federal law. 
1. State Trade Secret Protections 
Until the 1980s, trade secret protection was primarily adjudicated at the 
state level under the common law of unfair competition.139 This changed with 
the American Bar Association’s approval of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
(UTSA) in 1980 and its subsequent adoption by forty-eight states and the District 
of Columbia.140 The UTSA expressly displaces all other civil remedies for 
misappropriation except those sounding in contract law.141 
The UTSA defines a trade secret as: 
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, 
method, technique, or process that: 
   (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being 
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, 
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and 
   (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to 
maintain its secrecy.142 
This definition is broad but contains important boundaries. The first is that 
a trade secret must provide a “competitive advantage [to] its owner over 
competitors” that disclosure would undercut.143 Courts therefore examine the 
realistic probability that disclosure will result in competitive harm, particularly 
if the information is dated or general in nature.144 Some courts have also 
distinguished trade secrets from information that may “injure a company’s 
commercial standing [by exposing] defective products, poor or embarrassing 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. The Supreme Court held in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474 (1974), that 
constitutional and federal statutory provisions regarding patents do not preempt state trade secret laws. New 
York has not enacted trade secrets legislation but recognizes a common law cause of action for misappropriation. 
Delta Filter Corp. v. Morin, 485 N.Y.S.2d 143, 143 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (“New York has substantially adopted the 
approach of the original Restatement of Torts (1939) to the law of trade secrets.”); see also Schroeder v. Pinterest 
Inc., 17 N.Y.S.3d 678, 690–91 (Sup. Ct. 2015) (applying the Restatement to a trade secret misappropriation 
claim). 
 140. See Trade Secrets Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-
home?CommunityKey=3a2538fb-e030-4e2d-a9e2-90373dc05792 (last visited July 31, 2021). 
 141. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 7 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1985). North Carolina has 
adopted distinct trade secrets legislation but utilizes a very similar definition of “trade secret.” See N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 66–152(3) (2020). New York courts have applied a definition from the Restatement of Torts, which 
does not require efforts to maintain secrecy. See Ashland Mgmt. Inc. v. Janien, 624 N.E.2d 1007, 1012–13 (N.Y. 
1993). 
 142. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1(4). 
 143. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 n.15 (1984). 
 144. See, e.g., Prairie Island Indian Cmty. v. Minn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 658 N.W.2d 876, 887 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2003) (discussing the competitive value of old financial information); Formax Inc. v. Alkar-Rapidpak-MP 
Equip., Inc., No. 11-C-0298, 2014 WL 792086, at *1–3 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 25, 2014) (assessing the protection 
afforded to general customer and financial data). 
August 2021]    SECRET, LIES, AND LESSONS FROM THE THERANOS SCANDAL 1681 
business practices or similar commercial shortcomings.”145 In one case, the 
Second Circuit scoffed that the fact of a company’s poor management is “hardly 
a trade secret,”146 perhaps because such information, while embarrassing, does 
not confer a competitive advantage. In a similar vein, some courts have 
questioned whether trade secrets encompass “negative” information such as 
failed experiments,147 but most authorities recognize that such information can 
constitute a trade secret if it helps competitors save time or money.148 
The second requirement is actual secrecy. In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder 
Craft Boats, Inc.,149 the Supreme Court declared that trade secrets laws cannot 
substantially interfere with the use of information already in the public domain 
or discoverable from public sources.150 Efforts to maintain secrecy must be 
“reasonable under the circumstances” but need not be extensive; in some cases, 
it may suffice to simply inform employees that certain information is a trade 
secret.151 More thorough measures may include systematically limiting 
disclosure to employees or instituting password protections on the information 
itself. Many companies introduced universal NDAs for employees to cover 
themselves with respect to this requirement.152 
Misappropriation encompasses two categories of conduct. First, it includes 
the acquisition of a trade secret by means that the acquirer knows or has reason 
to know are improper.153 Improper means include bribery, theft, 
misrepresentation, espionage, and breach of a duty of secrecy,154 but generally 
do not include reverse engineering.155 Second, it includes the unauthorized use 
 
 145. Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. N. River Ins. Co., 73 F. Supp. 3d 544, 580 (W.D. Pa. 2014); see also 
Littlejohn v. Bic Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 685 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding, in a newspaper’s action for access to evidence 
used at trial, that “non-trade secret but confidential business information is not entitled to the same level of 
protection from disclosure . . . . particularly where, as here, the commercial interest stems primarily from a desire 
to preserve corporate reputation”). 
 146. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 894 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 
1059, 1074 (3d Cir. 1984) (explaining where the company’s subsidiary was manufacturing scotch without a 
permit, “the ‘sensitive’ information at issue here is not the kind of commercial information that courts have 
traditionally protected, e.g., trade secrets. It simply involves a matter of poor management.” (citation omitted)). 
 147. See, e.g., Hurst v. Hughes Tool Co., 634 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir.) (finding insufficient evidence of a 
trade secret where the information merely indicated “what not to do”), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 829 (1981); 
Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254, 260 n.6 (E.D. La. 1967) (“[T]here is some doubt whether 
such negative values are protected as trade secrets.”). 
 148. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1985) (stating 
that the definition of a trade secret “includes information that has commercial value from a negative viewpoint, 
for example the results of lengthy and expensive research which proves that a certain process will not work could 
be of great value to a competitor”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 
1995). 
 149. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989). 
 150. Id. at 146–47. 
 151. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1 cmt. 
 152. See infra Part III.C. 
 153. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1(2)(i). 
 154. Id. § 1(1). 
 155. Id. § 1 cmt. Companies have sought to circumvent the UTSA’s permissive policy towards reverse 
engineering by introducing product licenses that disallow reverse engineering as a condition of accessing the 
product. The legal validity of such license provisions, and their ability to trump the long-standing permissive 
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or disclosure of a trade secret by a person who (1) obtained it through improper 
means; (2) knew or had reason to know both that it was a trade secret and that 
their acquisition of it arose from a mistake or accident; or (3) knew or had reason 
to know that they had a duty to protect or limit its dissemination, or that their 
information came through a third party who used improper means to obtain it or 
had a duty to protect it.156 
The UTSA provides for injunctive relief against actual or threatened 
misappropriation, provided that the injunction last no longer than necessary to 
eliminate the commercial advantage gained by misappropriation.157 Prevailing 
plaintiffs may also receive damages for actual loss and unjust enrichment.158 In 
the case of willful and malicious misappropriation, courts may award additional 
exemplary damages of up to two times the calculated award.159 Attorneys’ fees 
may be awarded in the case of certain bad acts, such as willful and malicious 
misappropriation, bad faith efforts to terminate an injunction, and bad faith 
claims of misappropriation.160 
The UTSA does not address the tension between protection of 
whistleblowing and protection of trade secrets. There is also no exception under 
the UTSA for trade secret disclosures made in the public interest, though the 
accompanying comments acknowledge that the public interest may sometimes 
override a party’s interest in injunctive relief.161 Republic Aviation Corp. v. 
Schenk162 is cited as an example of such an overriding public concern.163 In 
Schenk, the defendant integrated misappropriated trade secrets into its aircraft 
weapons control systems, which were sold to the U.S. Armed Forces.164 
Enjoining the use of the technology, the court found, would endanger American 
soldiers fighting in Vietnam.165 The UTSA stipulates that in such “exceptional 
circumstances,” courts may permit continued use of the trade secret with the 
payment of a reasonable royalty to the plaintiff.166 
 
policy towards reverse engineering under trade secret doctrine, remain the subject of scholarly dispute and 
judicial disagreement. Samuel J. LaRoque, Comment, Reverse Engineering and Trade Secrets in a Post-Alice 
World, 66 KAN. L. REV. 427, 441–42 (2017). 
 156. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1(2)(ii). 
 157. Id. § 2 cmt. 
 158. Id. § 3(a). 
 159. Id. § 3(b). 
 160. Id. § 4. 
 161. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 2 cmt. 
 162. Republic Aviation Corp. v. Schenk, 1967 WL 7717 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 13, 1967). 
 163. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 2 cmt. 
 164. Republic Aviation Corp., 1967 WL 7717, at *1–2; UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 
AMENDMENTS § 2 cmt. 
 165. Republic Aviation Corp., 1967 WL 7717, at *7; UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS 
§ 2 cmt. 
 166. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 2(b). 
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2. Federal Trade Secrets Protections 
One year after Erika Cheung blew the whistle on Theranos, the law of trade 
secrets got a shot in the arm. The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA) 
created a federal civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation.167 Passed 
unanimously in the Senate and by an overwhelming vote in the House of 
Representatives,168 the statute closely mirrors the UTSA in many respects, while 
also resolving certain ambiguities that emerged in UTSA jurisprudence. 
The DTSA’s definition of “trade secret” comes from the Economic 
Espionage Act of 1996, which imposes criminal sanctions for the 
misappropriation of certain trade secrets.169 This definition generally aligns with 
the UTSA definition and adds a list of examples.170 Likewise, the definitions of 
misappropriation and improper means generally align with the UTSA.171 
The DTSA provides ample redress for companies that have suffered 
misappropriation. Plaintiffs may receive damages for actual losses and unjust 
enrichment, or, alternatively, the court may impose a reasonable royalty 
payment.172 In the case of “willful and malicious” misappropriation, the court 
may also award exemplary damages up to two times the calculated damages173 
and reasonable attorney’s fees.174 A court may, in “extraordinary 
circumstances,” order the seizure of the defendant’s property as necessary to 
prevent disclosure of the trade secret.175 
Unlike state laws derived from the UTSA, the DTSA directly tackles the 
tension between whistleblower rights and trade secret protection. Section 1833 
grants immunity from criminal and civil liability for the disclosure of a trade 
secret (1) in confidence to a government official or attorney for the sole purpose 
of reporting or investigating a suspected violation of law, or (2) in a complaint 
or other document under seal in a legal proceeding.176 Professor Peter S. Menell, 
whose scholarship heavily influenced the provision, noted that, “the 
whistleblower immunity provision is structured as an immunity and not a 
defense. . . . Hence, courts should allocate the burden of proof on the trade secret 
owner seeking to impose liability on a potential whistleblower.”177 This would 
allow dismissal of the claim early in the proceedings, reducing the employee’s 
 
 167. Defend Trade Secrets Act § 2, 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b). 
 168. S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 5 (2016); H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 5–6 (2016). 
 169. 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (criminalizing misappropriation); id. § 1839(3) (defining “trade secret” under both 
the DTSA and Economic Espionage Act). 
 170. Id. § 1839(3). 
 171. Id. § 1839(5)–(6). 
 172. Id. § 1836(b)(3)(B). 
 173. Id. § 1836(b)(3)(C). 
 174. Id. § 1836(b)(3)(D). 
 175. Id. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 176. Id. § 1833(b)(1)(A)–(B). 
 177. Peter S. Menell, The Defend Trade Secrets Act Whistleblower Immunity Provision: A Legislative 
History, 1 BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & TAX L. REV. 398, 425 (2017). 
1684 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 72:1663 
litigation burden and, therefore, the ability of employers to intimidate 
whistleblowers with the threat of lawsuits.178 
The DTSA has several other features that recognize the importance and 
realities of workplace whistleblowing. First, it includes independent contractors 
and consultants in the definition of “employee.”179 In an economy where 
independent contractors comprise a substantial and growing share of the 
workforce,180 depriving them of immunity would irrationally obstruct a 
significant source of whistleblower information. Moreover, their experience 
with a range of employers may equip them to detect suspicious practices more 
readily than employees. Second, the DTSA expressly permits whistleblowers to 
disclose trade secrets in confidence to an attorney for the purpose of 
whistleblowing and the purpose of filing an anti-retaliation lawsuit.181 This 
increases the likelihood that whistleblowers will proceed through lawful 
channels and enjoy maximal protections. Third, employers are required to 
provide notice to employees of whistleblower immunity under the DTSA in any 
contract that governs the use of trade secrets or confidential information.182 As 
an alternative, the employer can simply cross-reference a company policy that 
sets forth the provision.183 Failure to notify an employee in this manner may 
result in the denial of exemplary damages or attorney’s fees against the 
employee.184 
The DTSA did much to clarify the intersection of whistleblower and 
employer rights, but certain gaps remain. First, in the few cases adjudicated thus 
far, the DTSA’s immunity provision has not generally resulted in dismissal of 
trade secrets claims at the pleadings stage.185 Rather than treating the provision 
 
 178. See id. at 417. 
 179. 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(4). 
 180. There is dispute over the precise number of independent contractors. The Department of Labor reported 
that independent contractors comprised 6.9% of the labor market in 2017. Press Release, Bureau of Lab. Stat., 
U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Contingent & Alternative Employment Arrangements–May 2017 (June 7, 2018), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/conemp.pdf. This figure is likely an underestimate, as the report’s 
methodology omitted workers who do contract work to supplement their primary employment, or who did not 
do contract work within the week the survey was conducted. Frequently Asked Questions About Data on 
Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/ 
cps/contingent-and-alternative-arrangements-faqs.htm (Aug. 7, 2018). 
 181. 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(1)(A)(i). 
 182. Id. § 1833(b)(3)(A). 
 183. Id. § 1833(b)(3)(B). 
 184. Id. § 1833(b)(3)(C). 
 185. See, e.g., Unum Grp. v. Loftus, 220 F. Supp. 3d 143, 147 (D. Mass. 2016); 1-800 Remodel, Inc. v. 
Bodor, No. CV 18-472-DMG (EX), 2018 WL 6340759, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2018); Garcia v. Vertical 
Screen, Inc., No. CV 19-3184, 2020 WL 2615624, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 2020); Argos USA LLC v. Young, 
No. 1:18-CV-02797-ELR, 2019 WL 4125968, at *6 (N.D. Ga. June 28, 2019). Conversely, in Christian v. 
Lannett Co., the court held that the employee’s disclosures fell within the DTSA’s immunity provision. Christian 
v. Lannett Co., No. CV 16-963, 2018 WL 1532849, at *4–5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2018). The employee in Lannett 
filed discrimination claims against the company, which counterclaimed trade secret misappropriation. Id. at *4. 
The court found that the only disclosures made after the DTSA’s enactment occurred pursuant to a discovery 
order in the discrimination case and that “despite numerous opportunities to conduct discovery on this issue, 
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as akin to sovereign immunity, as Professor Menell intended, courts have treated 
it as an affirmative defense.186 As such, a motion to dismiss may only be granted 
if the complaint contains sufficient facts to establish the defense.187 In a well-
drafted complaint for misappropriation, the company’s lawyers can avoid 
including sufficient facts to establish all of the elements of the whistleblower 
defense.188 In particular, it may be difficult to establish that the whistleblower 
disclosed the trade secrets “in confidence” and “for the sole purpose of reporting 
or investigating a suspected violation of law.”189 In one case where an employee 
gave documents to his attorney, the court ruled that: 
it is not ascertainable from the complaint whether [the employee] turned over 
all of [the company’s] documents to his attorney, which documents he took 
and what information they contained, or whether he used, is using, or plans to 
use, those documents for any purpose other than investigating a potential 
violation of law.190 
In short, because courts have treated Section 1833 as an affirmative defense 
rather than an immunity, it has not protected whistleblowers from potentially 
costly and extended litigation. 
Second, the DTSA leaves whistleblowers exposed to several sources of 
liability. The protections of Section 1833 cover the disclosure but not the 
improper acquisition of trade secrets.191 A whistleblower who emails company 
data to their personal email account to preserve it for a covered disclosure may 
thus be liable for misappropriation.192 Whistleblowers who take company files 
may also have liability under statutes such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act (CFAA),193 which forbids accessing a computer and taking information 
without authorization, or in excess of authorization.194 Because whistleblowers 
 
Defendant has failed to provide any facts which would enable the Court to discern whether Plaintiff intentionally 
or accidentally disclosed the alleged trade secrets.” Id. at *5. 
 186. See supra note 185; Peter S. Menell, Misconstruing Whistleblower Immunity Under the Defend Trade 
Secrets Act, 1 NEV. L.J.F. 92, 95 (2017) (“Rather than recognize that [the defendant] enjoyed immunity from 
liability, the court [in Unum] treated the whistleblower provision merely as an affirmative defense. . . . This is 
precisely the murky situation that Congress expressly corrected when it immunized employees and 
contractors.”). 
 187. See Rodi v. S. New Eng. Sch. of L., 389 F.3d 5, 12 (1st Cir. 2004); Bethel v. Jendoco Constr. Corp., 
570 F.2d 1168, 1174 n.10 (3d Cir. 1978); EPCO Carbon Dioxide Prods., Inc. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 
467 F.3d 466, 470 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 188. See Unum, 220 F. Supp. 3d at 147; Garcia, 2020 WL 2615624, at *5; 1-800 Remodel, 2018 WL 
6340759, at *6. 
 189. See 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(1)(A)–(B). 
 190. Unum, 220 F. Supp. 3d at 147. 
 191. See 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(1). 
 192. See 1-800 Remodel, 2018 WL 6340759, at *5 (denying a motion to dismiss where the defendant 
“forwarded Plaintiff’s confidential and proprietary information from her work email account to her personal 
email address. . . . These allegations also give rise to the plausible inference that Defendant committed theft to 
acquire this information, which constitutes ‘improper means’ for the purposes of the DTSA”); Henry Schein, 
Inc. v. Cook, 191 F. Supp. 3d 1072, 1077 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (holding that the plaintiff stated a valid claim under 
the DTSA when an employee forwarded trade secrets to her personal email account and devices). 
 193. 18 U.S.C. § 1030. 
 194. Id. § 1030(a)(1). 
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often retrieve electronic files to substantiate their report of suspected 
lawbreaking, CFAA claims often appear alongside misappropriation claims.195 
Moreover, virtually every state also has a version of the CFAA that provides 
companies with a cause of action.196 Professor Menell rightly contends that 
because the DTSA whistleblower immunity covers the use of the files, damages 
for wrongful acquisition alone would likely be quite limited.197 Nevertheless, the 
prospect of litigation and liability under these laws may deter potential 
whistleblowers who believe their disclosure will be fruitless without supporting 
documentation. It could also blindside whistleblowers who were reassured by 
the DTSA notice of immunity in their contract or company policy but did not 
think to distinguish between acquisition and disclosure. Finally, the DTSA does 
not expressly preclude liability for breach of contract.198 The next Subpart 
explores the contractual principles governing the enforceability of NDAs in the 
whistleblower context. 
C. CONTRACTS FOR NONDISCLOSURE 
Employee nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) are prevalent in the modern 
workplace, particularly in the technology sector.199 Employers may introduce 
standalone confidentiality agreements or include nondisclosure provisions in 
employment contracts or binding employee policies or handbooks.200 This 
Subpart examines the utility, content, and enforceability of NDAs extracted as a 
condition of employment.201 
NDAs serve several functions for employers.202 First, by specifying the 
precise type of information that the company considers confidential, NDAs put 
employees on notice of their obligations and increase the likelihood of 
compliance.203 Second, NDAs demonstrate that the listed information is “the 
subject of efforts . . . to maintain its secrecy” and thus meets the definition of a 
 
 195. See, e.g., Argos USA LLC v. Young, No. 1:18-CV-02797-ELR, 2019 WL 4125968, at *10–11 (N.D. 
Ga. June 28, 2019); Christian v. Lannett Co., No. CV 16-963, 2018 WL 1532849, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2018); 
1-800 Remodel, 2018 WL 6340759, at *6–7. 
 196. See, e.g., Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act, CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (West 2021); 
Personal and Commercial Computer Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-601–606 (2021). 
 197. Menell, supra note 177, at 426 (“If DTSA immunity applies, then the harm in such other causes of 
action is limited to the cost of the paper, ink, or laptop computer that was allegedly stolen or damaged, and 
cannot extend to the value associated with information contained on such media or device. Otherwise, the very 
chilling effects that Congress sought to prevent through the DTSA whistleblower immunity provision would be 
circumvented through these other causes of action.”). 
 198. See 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(1). 
 199. Jeff John Roberts, Why You Should Be Worried About Tech’s Love Affair with NDAs, FORTUNE (Apr. 
29, 2019, 3:30 AM), https://fortune.com/2019/04/29/silicon-valley-nda/ (reporting that every low-level 
employee and contractor at tech giants Google, Apple, and Amazon must sign nondisclosure agreements). 
 200. Richard Moberly, Confidentiality and Whistleblowing, 96 N.C. L. REV. 751, 761 (2018). 
 201. Employers often require NDAs as a condition of severance pay or as part of the settlement of claims. 
 202. See Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Buying Silence, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 151, 157 
(1998). 
 203. Id. 
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statutorily protected trade secret.204 Third, companies with NDAs on file have 
the option of bringing a contractual claim in addition to, or in lieu of, any other 
causes of action that may be available against an employee who discloses 
covered information.205 If another cause of action—such as trade secret 
misappropriation—falters, the employer may retain a viable contractual claim. 
Fourth, employers often use NDAs to conceal information that does not 
constitute a trade secret.206 The hallmark of a trade secret is that it offers some 
sort of business or competitive advantage that disclosure would undercut. NDAs 
may cover more generic categories of “confidential” or “proprietary” 
information.207 Some authorities claim that these terms are coextensive with 
trade secrets,208 but many recognize confidential and proprietary information as 
encompassing a broader category of protectable information, such as financial 
forecasts and performance data.209 NDAs may introduce their own definitions of 
confidential or proprietary information, with broad formulations such as 
“information . . . that would . . . otherwise appear to a reasonable person to be 
confidential or proprietary in the context and circumstances in which the 
information is known or used.”210 They may even take on the flavor of non-
disparagement agreements, covering information that is merely embarrassing, 
such as incidents that reveal incompetence or bad character.211 The NDA used 
by Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign exhibits the remarkable breadth 
 
 204. Menell, supra note 136, at 16 (quoting UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1985)). 
 205. See, e.g., Garcia v. Vertical Screen, Inc., No. 19-3184, 2020 WL 2615624, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 
2020). 
 206. Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property: Human Capital Law and the Reach of Intellectual Property, 
93 TEX. L. REV. 789, 810 (2015) (“Contractually, it has become standard to include broad and open-ended lists 
of confidential information that goes beyond the statutory definition of trade secrets.”); Norman D. Bishara, 
Kenneth J. Martin & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses and Other 
Restrictive Postemployment Covenants, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1, 43 (2015) (“[T]he majority of firms will seek the 
broadest possible restrictions.”). 
 207. The Restatement of Employment Law states that employers have a legitimate interest in protecting 
“other protectable confidential information that does not meet the definition of trade secret.” RESTATEMENT OF 
EMP. L. § 8.07(b)(1) (AM. L. INST. 2015). The comments, in explaining confidential information, are unhelpful 
in that they effectively restate the definition of a trade secret and cite no illuminating examples. See id. 
 208. See, e.g., United Rug Auctioneers, Inc. v. Arsalen, No. CA03-0347, 2003 WL 21527545, at *6 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. Apr. 11, 2003) (“Trade secrets and confidential information are essentially identical concepts.”). 
 209. See, e.g., Erhart v. Bofl Holding, Inc., No. 15-CV-02287-BAS-NLS, 2017 WL 588390, at *9 (S.D. 
Cal. Feb. 14, 2017) (recognizing that the company “has an interest in protecting other confidential business 
information that may not qualify for trade secret protection”); Orthofix, Inc. v. Hunter, 630 Fed. App’x 566, 
571–74 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that, under Texas law, protectable confidential information does not need to 
have trade secrets status “so long as it does not encompass publicly available information or an employee’s 
general knowledge or skills”); FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(b)(2) (2021) (deeming “[v]aluable confidential business 
or professional information that otherwise does not qualify as trade secrets” protectable); Revere Transducers, 
Inc. v. Deere & Co., 595 N.W.2d 751, 765 (Iowa 1999); What Is Proprietary Information?, LAW DICTIONARY, 
https://thelawdictionary.org/proprietary-information/ (last visited July 31, 2021) (stating that proprietary 
information “can relate to budget information and research results”). 
 210. This language is provided in the Westlaw Practical Law sample employee confidentiality agreement. 
Employee Confidentiality and Proprietary Rights Agreement, THOMSON REUTERS (2020). 
 211. Moberly, supra note 200, at 766–67 (finding that 64.1% of settlement agreements in Sarbanes-Oxley 
whistleblower retaliation cases contained a non-disparagement provision). 
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of some agreements, defining “Confidential Information” to include “any 
information that Mr. Trump insists remain private or confidential,” including 
information about the personal life, political affairs, and business affairs of 
members of the Trump family.212 Such constructions provide minimal guidance 
to employees and maximum recourse to employers. 
Finally, NDAs serve to chill even protected employee disclosures. Because 
employee NDAs often protect their own contents from disclosure, our 
knowledge of their contents is largely anecdotal, based on accounts of 
employment lawyers and the small percentage of NDAs that become public 
through legal proceedings.213 This sampling nevertheless reveals a tendency 
towards severe terms, including terms designed to intimidate whistleblowers out 
of exercising their legal rights. For example, NDAs may require employees to 
inform the employer any time they reveal information to the government.214 This 
tactic was employed by the engineering firm KBR, Inc., which required internal 
investigation witnesses to sign an NDA that threatened discipline or termination 
if they revealed matters to outside parties without the prior approval of the 
KBR’s legal department.215 Other draconian features include mandatory 
arbitration, hefty liquidated damages, and/or employee indemnification of the 
company’s enforcement costs.216 Some lawyers have sought to undermine 
whistleblower bounty programs by drafting NDAs that waive the employee’s 
right to government awards or even assign those awards to the company.217 The 
inclusion of these provisions may chill whistleblowing even if they are likely to 
ultimately prove unenforceable.218 The next section explores the contours of 
NDA enforceability. 
1. Enforceability of NDAs Against Whistleblowers 
Courts presumptively enforce private commercial contracts in order to 
provide predictability in the market economy and lower the transaction costs of 
 
 212. READ: 2016 Trump Campaign Nondisclosure Agreement, CNN (Aug. 14, 2018, 4:37 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/14/politics/trump-campaign-nda-omarosa/index.html. 
 213. Moberly, supra note 200, at 763–64. 
 214. Richard Moberly, Jordan A. Thomas & Jason Zuckerman, De Facto Gag Clauses: The Legality of 
Employment Agreements That Undermine Dodd-Frank’s Whistleblower Provisions, 30 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. 
L. 87, 88 (2014). 
 215. KBR Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 74619, at 2 (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/ 
litigation/admin/2015/34-74619.pdf. This resulted in a fine of $130,000. Id. at 4. 
 216. See READ: 2016 Trump Campaign Nondisclosure Agreement, supra note 212. 
 217. Moberly, supra note 200, at 766–67 (finding that 43.8% of settlement agreements in Sarbanes-Oxley 
whistleblower retaliation cases contained a waiver of future reward or recovery). 
 218. This is believed to be true of unenforceable contract provisions in general. See Harlan M. Blake, 
Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 682–83 (1960) (postulating that in the context of 
invalid noncompete agreements, “[f]or every covenant that finds its way to court, there are thousands which 
exercise an in terrorem effect on employees who respect their contractual obligations[.]”). Recognizing this 
reality, the Dodd-Frank Act prohibits any contractual waiver of rights or remedies provided for in its 
whistleblower protection provisions, including the right to independent counsel. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(d)(1), (h)(3); 
see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-17 (2020). 
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business.219 In rare instances, however, public policy may override the terms of 
an otherwise valid agreement.220 Such public policy exceptions may be codified 
by statute221 or, more controversially, pronounced by courts.222 Because no 
statute (save Rule 21F-17) expressly bans the contractual silencing of 
whistleblowers, this Subpart explores how courts have approached questions of 
whether and when to enforce NDAs against them. 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that contracts are enforceable 
unless the interests of the party seeking enforcement are “clearly outweighed” 
by the public policy imperative.223 In this balancing test, three factors weigh in 
favor of enforcement: (1) the justifiable expectation of one or more parties that 
the contract was enforceable;224 (2) whether the party seeking enforcement 
would suffer a forfeiture, or the party seeking avoidance would be unjustly 
enriched;225 and (3) whether there is any special public interest in favor of 
enforcement.226 These factors must be weighed against: (4) the strength of the 
public policy, particularly whether it is rooted in important legislation or 
regulations;227 (5) the nexus between the contract and the public policy (that is, 
the extent to which the court would further or undermine the policy by its 
treatment of the contract);228 and (6) whether the contract involves 
 
 219. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE 
L.J. 541, 565 (2003) ([T]he state reduces social costs by giving parties that function in volatile markets the 
opportunity to make enforceable contracts for future delivery.”). 
 220. See Balt. & Ohio Sw. Ry. Co. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498, 505 (1900) (“[T]he right of private contract is 
no small part of the liberty of the citizen, and that the usual and most important function of courts of justice is 
rather to maintain and enforce contracts than to enable parties thereto to escape from their obligation on the 
pretext of public policy, unless it clearly appear [sic] that they contravene public right or the public welfare.”). 
 221. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391 (1898) (“This right of contract, however, is itself subject to certain 
limitations which the State may lawfully impose in the exercise of its police powers.”). Many states, for example, 
have forbidden health management organizations from contractually restricting the freedom of physicians to 
discuss treatments. Robert Pear, Laws Won’t Let H.M.O.’s Tell Doctors What to Say, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 
1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/09/17/us/laws-won-t-let-hmo-s-tell-doctors-what-to-say.html. In 2016, 
Congress banned companies from using form contracts to prohibit or penalize customers who post negative 
reviews. 15 U.S.C. § 45b(b)(1). 
 222. See, e.g., Walter Gellhorn, Contracts and Public Policy, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 679, 682 (1935) (“[T]he 
courts have persisted in speculating (and in reaching divergent conclusions) as to whether the legislature 
‘intended’ contracts to be treated as void when they ran afoul of laws which penalized some act of the contractors 
but which said nothing concerning enforcement of the bargains.”); M.P. Furmston, The Analysis of Illegal 
Contracts, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 267, 308 (1965) (“It is well known that it is usually easier to decide a case than 
to give reasons for the decision. Nowhere is this more evident than in the field of public policy where the courts 
are, ex hypothesi, dealing with matters outside their usual experience. The result has been an unusually large 
proportion of decisions unquestionable in the result, but based on reasoning not convincingly or completely 
adumbrated.”). 
 223. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
 224. Id. § 178(2)(a). 
 225. Id. § 178(2)(b). 
 226. Id. § 178(2)(c). 
 227. Id. § 178(3)(a). The Restatement cautions against assigning undue weight to minor or attenuated 
legislation or regulations. Id. § 178 cmt. c. 
 228. Id. § 178(3)(b), (d). 
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“misconduct,” such as a promise or inducement to commit a tort or violate a 
fiduciary duty.229 
In practice, few courts explicitly utilize this balancing test, and observers 
have long lamented the absence of a uniform judicial approach.230 One 
consistent theme, however, is the importance of a legislative or regulatory hook 
for the policy. The Supreme Court has cautioned that overriding a contract 
requires “explicit public policy” that is “well defined and dominant [and 
ascertainable] ‘by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from 
general considerations of supposed public interests.’”231 A recent empirical 
study of contract cases found that public policy arguments rooted in a statute or 
regulation had nearly twice the success rate of those appealing to general public 
policy concerns.232 
The enforcement of employee NDAs against whistleblowers pits the 
commercial interest in confidentiality against the public interest in stopping 
corporate misconduct. Whether courts enforce covenants for silence against 
whistleblowers depends on a range of circumstances, including the policy 
implicated, the manner of whistleblowing, and the extent of the disclosure. As 
described below, courts are more receptive to public policy arguments where the 
disclosure occurs in a legally prescribed and confidential manner and consists 
only of information relevant to the misconduct. Cases can be broadly grouped 
according to the specific public policy asserted: 
• Reporting Unlawful Activity.  
Public policy strongly favors reporting criminal activity to law 
enforcement.233 In a recent case, a federal court construed this public 
policy more broadly than the protections of the state whistleblower 
 
 229. Id. § 178(3)(c); see also id. § 178 cmt. d, illus. 6–16. The comments give the example of a contract that 
induces a party to vote in a particular way, and notes that although voting is not objectionable behavior, the 
inducement thereof is offensive to democratic norms and expectations. Id. 
 230. See, e.g., Richardson v. Mellish (1824) 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303; 2 Bing. 229, 252 (Burrough, J.) (Eng.) 
(likening the public policy doctrine to a “very unruly horse,” in that “when once you get astride it you never 
know where it will carry you. It may lead you from the sound law. It is never argued at all but when other points 
fail”); see also David Adam Friedman, Bringing Order to Contracts Against Public Policy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 563, 613–14 (2012) (examining a six-month range of cases and finding few uses of the Restatement’s 
balancing test). State jurisprudence can vary considerably in its receptiveness to public policy arguments. One 
study found that New York decisions show a broad indisposition towards them, while California courts exhibit 
greater readiness to upset contracts that undermine good morals or “that sense of security for individual rights, 
whether of personal liberty or private property, which any citizen ought to feel.” Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargaining 
on the Red-Eye: New Light on Contract Theory 25–27 (N.Y.U. SCH. OF L., CTR. FOR L. & ECON., Working Paper 
No. 08-21, 2008), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1129805. 
 231. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Loc. Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983) (quoting Muschany v. United States, 
324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)). 
 232. Friedman, supra note 230, at 566. 
 233. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 696–97 (1972) (“[I]t is obvious that agreements to conceal 
information relevant to commission of crime have very little to recommend them from the standpoint of public 
policy.”); Fomby-Denson v. Dep’t of Army, 247 F.3d 1366, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Bowman v. Parma Bd. 
of Educ., 542 N.E.2d 663, 666–67 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (holding that contracts cannot require the suppression 
of criminal conduct). 
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statute.234 An internal auditor identified securities law violations and 
emailed incriminating documents to his mother to prevent their 
destruction.235 The court declined to enforce the auditor’s NDA in 
subsequent litigation, citing the fact that the auditor had carefully 
selected incriminating documents and released them only to prevent 
their destruction.236 
• Asserting Fraud Against the Government.  
Courts generally decline to enforce NDAs against plaintiffs in qui 
tam suits under the False Claims Act.237 A 2011 case suggests, 
however, that this safe harbor may depend on the breadth of the 
whistleblower’s disclosure. In Cafasso v. General Dynamics,238 the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the company and 
reserved judgment on a public policy exception to NDAs in qui tam 
suits, finding that “[e]ven were we to adopt such an exception, it 
would not cover Cafasso’s conduct given her vast and indiscriminate 
appropriation” of company files.239 The court fretted that an 
exception broad enough to protect Cafasso, who copied nearly 
eleven gigabytes of data, “would make all confidentiality 
agreements unenforceable as long as the employee later files a qui 
tam action.”240 If the court were to adopt such a public policy 
exception, it warned that qui tam plaintiffs would need to justify with 
a “particularized showing” that the NDA violation was reasonably 
necessary to pursue the fraud claim.241 
• Participating in Government Investigations.  
Courts have overridden NDAs in favor of allowing participation in 
government investigations. In one case, the First Circuit applied a 
balancing test to determine that, despite the public policy strongly 
favoring voluntary settlement of employment discrimination claims, 
settlement agreements prohibiting communication and cooperation 
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission are void as 
against public policy.242 
• Providing Information in Litigation.  
 
 234. Erhart v. Bofl Holding, Inc., No. 15-CV-02287-BAS-NLS, 2017 WL 588390, at *13–15 (S.D. Cal. 
Feb. 14, 2017). 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Head v. Kane Co., 668 F. Supp. 2d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The court 
held that a private agreement was unenforceable insofar as it required the qui tam plaintiff to return documents 
that would likely be needed as evidence at trial. Id. Because Congress enacted the qui tam provision to encourage 
disclosures of fraud against the government, and the FCA requires plaintiffs to submit all relevant evidence that 
they possess, enforcing such an agreement would “unduly frustrate the purpose” of the law. Id. 
 238. Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 239. Id. at 1062. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. E.E.O.C. v. Astra U.S.A., Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 744 (1st Cir. 1996). Title VII expressly protects employees 
from retaliation for participating in investigations. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a). 
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Courts generally hold that NDAs cannot enjoin witness testimony in 
official proceedings.243 The more complicated questions concern 
whether NDAs enjoin employees from conferring with litigants and 
providing information to develop their claims. To resolve these 
questions, courts balance the interests of the litigants as well as any 
broader public interest.244 Some courts have agreed to enjoin NDA 
enforcement for interviews conducted under controlled conditions, 
such as court preapproval of the questions, notice to the company 
and an opportunity to attend the interview, and a prohibition on 
interviewees disclosing privileged information or trade secrets.245 
Conversely, they have generally enforced NDAs against employees 
who initiate contact with plaintiffs and provide information without 
court oversight.246 
• Protecting Public Health, Safety, and Welfare.  
Some scholars contend that NDAs should not be enforced against 
employees who disclose risks to public health, safety, or the 
environment, regardless of whether there is a legal violation.247 
Courts have considered but not generally validated this view,248 
though they have occasionally shown sympathy for employers that 
violate the nondisclosure provisions of severance agreements to 
 
 243.  See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Severn Trent Servs. Inc., 358 F.3d 438, 441 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The Commission 
could have sought and obtained judicial enforcement of the subpoena, since obviously Murphy could not by 
signing a contract excuse or disable himself from testifying.”); Zanders v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 898 F.2d 
1127, 1133 (6th Cir. 1990) (opining in dicta that “[i]f we were compelled to address Zanders’ public policy 
argument, we would nevertheless find it without merit . . . . [W]e note that the severance contract at issue here 
expressly provides that the agreement would not bar her participation in proceedings when ‘required by law’”). 
There are, however, countervailing cases, most notably that of former tobacco executive Jeffrey Wigand, who 
reported to regulators and on national television that Brown & Williamson knew nicotine was addictive and 
included chemical additives to increase its effects. Brown & Williamson successfully obtained an injunction 
preventing him from testifying in lawsuits against the company. Rebecca Leung, Battling Big Tobacco: Mike 
Wallace Talks to the Highest-Ranking Tobacco Whistleblower, CBS NEWS (Jan. 13, 2005), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/battling-big-tobacco/; Jodi L. Short, Killing the Messenger: The Use of 
Nondisclosure Agreements to Silence Whistleblowers, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1207, 1209–11 (1999). 
 244. See, e.g., Astra U.S.A., 94 F.3d at 744. 
 245. See, e.g., In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1137–39 (N.D. Cal. 2002) 
(holding that questions must be submitted and approved by the court, and enjoining employees from disclosing 
privileged information or confidential business methods in securities litigation); Chambers v. Cap. Cities/ABC, 
159 F.R.D 441, 445–46 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that the defendant must have notice and an opportunity to 
attend interviews in age discrimination litigation). 
 246. See, e.g., Saini v. Int’l Game Tech., 434 F. Supp. 2d 913, 921–23 (D. Nev. 2006) (holding that the 
interest in enforcing the agreement overrode the public interest in uncovering defective products that did not 
threaten public safety or wellbeing, and also that the former employee did not deserve classification as a 
whistleblower because he acted from private rather than public motives in products liability litigation); Uniroyal 
Goodrich Tire Co. v. Hudson, 97 F.3d 1452, 1996 WL 520789, at *10 (6th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (affirming 
an injunction against a former employee who went to work for the plaintiff as an expert witness and consultant 
in products liability litigation). 
 247. See, e.g., Carol M. Bast, At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality Agreements Enforceable?, 25 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 627, 681–82 (1999) (arguing that public health and safety should be considered perhaps the 
most important public policy); Short, supra note 243, at 1212. 
 248. See Saini, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 921. 
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warn that a former employee poses a risk to the public.249 Courts are 
particularly unsympathetic to employees that report health and safety 
concerns to the media.250 In one case, an employee allowed press to 
enter the company premises after internal reports of contamination 
went unheeded.251 The court found that this action was “not 
protected by any public policy.”252 
In balancing these public policy concerns against the employer’s interest 
in confidentiality, courts have typically shown deference to the employer’s trade 
secrets.253 This is reasonable in that many types of corporate wrongdoing, such 
as employment discrimination, can be reported and adjudicated without the 
disclosure of corporate trade secrets. In other cases, however, the facts 
evidencing wrongdoing may not be cleanly divisible from legitimate trade 
secrets. In the Theranos example, explaining the rigging of proficiency tests 
might require the disclosure of protected details of the device mechanism itself. 
In such cases, the DTSA’s immunity provision, while not expressly protecting 
whistleblowers from contractual liability, strengthens and lends an important 
statutory hook to a public policy defense. Moreover, the law may help to ensure 
that any liability under an NDA results in minimal damages. 
Even if an NDA ultimately proves unenforceable, it still serves the 
employer’s interests in chilling disclosures. In many enforcement suits, the 
employer’s goal is probably not to obtain damages – most workers are 
effectively judgement-proof – but to intimidate the target and other potential 
whistleblowers. Wealthy whistleblowers are better positioned to withstand the 
threats and costs of lawsuits. This is evident in the Theranos case, where Alan 
Beam (middle class and with a family to support) agreed to settle and Tyler 
Shultz (from a wealthy family and without any dependents) did not. 
An employee who contemplates whistleblowing ventures into a complex 
and ambiguous legal landscape. Whistleblower protection statutes vary 
substantially in their protectiveness based on the jurisdiction and subject matter. 
Trade secret laws offer somewhat more uniformity, and the DTSA in particular 
has taken important steps to harmonize how courts treat whistleblowers who 
disclose trade secrets. Contractual principles, which govern the enforceability of 
NDAs, may provide an additional cause of action to employers. They also 
 
 249. Giannecchini v. Hosp. of St. Raphael, 780 A.2d 1006, 1012–14 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000) (considering 
the health and safety argument, but ultimately holding hospital liable for breaching the NDA that protected a 
nurse’s personnel records); Bowman v. Parma Bd. of Educ., 44 Ohio App.3d 169, 176–78 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) 
(refusing to enforce a confidentiality agreement protecting a teacher’s record of child molestation). 
 250. See, e.g., Erhart v. Bofl Holding, Inc., No. 15-CV-02287-BAS-NLS, 2017 WL 588390, at *15 (S.D. 
Cal. Feb. 14, 2017); Gosa v. Nu-World Amaranth, Inc., No. 10-CV-2074-LRR, 2012 WL 463023, at *4 (N.D. 
Iowa Feb. 11, 2012). 
 251. Gosa, 2012 WL 463023, at *2. 
 252. Id. at *5. 
 253. See, e.g., In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1134–37, 1139 (N.D. Cal. 2002) 
(excluding confidential business methods from the scope of information that may be disclosed by employees 
during pre-deposition interviews); McGrane v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 822 F. Supp 1044, 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 
(“Disclosures of wrongdoing do not constitute revelations of trade secrets . . . .”). 
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introduce an additional measure of uncertainty for whistleblowers regarding 
whether public policy in favor of protecting whistleblowers will preclude 
enforcement of an NDA. As discussed further in Part V, whistleblowers may 
find themselves in legal limbo at the intersection of these laws. 
V.  LESSONS FROM THERANOS 
The Theranos story illustrates the plight of whistleblowers lost in an 
unethical corporate culture and a discordant legal landscape. The result, as the 
experience of Erika Cheung reveals, is needless legal exposure for 
whistleblowers and delayed accountability for employers. This Part begins by 
tracing Cheung’s long and risky path to legal protection. It then critically 
assesses the whistleblower legal regimes, identifying flaws that contributed to 
Cheung’s legal jeopardy and the perpetuation of Theranos’s misconduct. 
Finally, it offers suggestions on reforming the law to secure reliable and 
accessible protection for workplace whistleblowers. 
A. THE ROAD TO PROTECTION AT THERANOS 
Erika Cheung reported wrongdoing in three stages: internally to higher-
ups; to a Wall Street Journal reporter; and finally, to the federal regulator. Her 
trajectory, which put her in significant professional and legal jeopardy, 
illuminates certain legal and practical obstacles to reporting corporate 
misconduct. 
 Internal Reports. Cheung, along with her colleague Tyler Shultz, began 
by expressing concerns to company leaders. California’s anti-retaliation statute 
would only have protected these reports if she reasonably believed she was 
reporting unlawful behavior. While Cheung plainly considered the proficiency 
testing practices to be unethical and dangerous, it is not clear whether she 
believed them unlawful or, indeed, whether she contemplated their legality at 
all. It is therefore uncertain whether she would have been protected by California 
law. Cheung certainly would not have enjoyed protection under federal law. The 
FCA’s whistleblower provision would only have applied if she had expressly 
connected her concerns to Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement. There is no 
indication that she did so. 
 Media Reports. After resigning from Theranos, Cheung spoke to a 
reporter on the condition of anonymity. These disclosures nevertheless proved 
traceable to her, exposing her to liability under her NDA and perhaps also under 
California’s trade secrets statute. The latter’s application depends on whether 
she revealed trade secrets. A generic claim of corporate lawbreaking would not 
constitute a trade secret, but her substantiating details about the blood testing 
technology and protocols could conceivably fall within the trade secret ambit. 
California’s trade secrets law, which is essentially coterminous with the UTSA, 
contains no express exception for whistleblowing. Even the DTSA (which had 
not yet been enacted) does not protect reports to the media. Likewise, courts will 
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not shield employees who blow the whistle to the media from contractual 
liability. In short, Cheung enjoyed no protection at this stage. 
 CMS Report. After receiving pro bono legal advice, Cheung reported 
Theranos to CMS. By then, she had concluded that Theranos’s practices violated 
proficiency testing regulations. She also directed her report to the appropriate 
regulating agency. These factors would weigh strongly against enforcing her 
NDA, provided that the scope of her disclosures was commensurate with the 
legal violations. If her disclosures were found to contain trade secrets, however, 
Cheung could still have faced potential liability under California’s trade secrets 
statute. Today, the report to CMS would entitle Cheung to the DTSA’s 
protections against liability under federal or state trade secrets laws. After years 
of Theranos endangering the public with faulty blood tests, Cheung found a 
somewhat secure path to holding her old company accountable. 
 Cheung’s inability to swiftly and securely report Theranos’s behavior 
illuminates several flaws in the whistleblower legal framework. The following 
section traces the obstacles she encountered to fundamental weaknesses in the 
America’s patchwork of legal protections. 
B. FLAWS IN THE PATCHWORK 
 
The purpose of whistleblower protection is to promote legal compliance by 
encouraging reports of corporate misconduct to internal supervisors and 
regulators.254 In the case of Theranos, it failed spectacularly. In the absence of 
clear, navigable, and reliable legal protections, the whistleblowers resorted to ad 
hoc measures, which ultimately delayed actionable reports and put the 
whistleblowers in significant jeopardy. This Subpart explores the purpose of 
whistleblower protection and identifies weaknesses in the existing framework 
that impede this purpose. 
 
1. Whistleblower Protection in Theory 
 
Behavioral economics informs us that individuals blow the whistle when 
they believe the benefits will exceed the costs.255 The salient benefits and costs 
may be intrinsic (i.e., feelings of gratification or guilt) or extrinsic (i.e., social 
and material rewards or sanctions).256 The law can shape extrinsic incentives 
through several mechanisms, including whistleblower protection.257 By 
 
 254. Robert G. Vaughn, State Whistleblower Statutes and the Future of Whistleblower Protection, 51 
ADMIN. L. REV. 581, 586 (1999) (asserting that whistleblower protection “vindicates important interests 
supporting the enforcement of criminal and civil laws”); Id. at 599 (explaining that protection of internal 
disclosures “allows employers to address and resolve problems”). 
 255. Id. at 1183. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards, 
Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1161–71 (2010). Other 
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insulating workers from extrinsic costs imposed by employers, whistleblower 
protection alters the balance of incentives. Protection is a particularly salient 
factor for employees whose motivations are “intrinsic and moralistic” rather than 
guided by self-interest.258 In addition to shaping extrinsic incentives, laws may 
affect intrinsic motivations by coding certain behaviors as moral or immoral.259 
Through this “expressive power,” whistleblower protection may reinforce the 
wrongness of corporate misconduct and the rectitude of whistleblowing.260 
 In order to effectively shape motivations and behavior, whistleblower 
protections must be known, navigable, and perceived as reliable by the workers 
they target. Yet the protection cannot be so broad as to facilitate false or frivolous 
accusations, which damage corporate reputations and overburden regulators.261 
The goal, then, is to encourage reports of misconduct to internal or external 
authorities while protecting legitimate business interests in confidentiality. The 
Theranos case study illustrates several problems in the framework that impede 
this policy goal. These are discussed below. 
 
2. Weaknesses in the Legal Landscape 
 
Part III explored some of the weaknesses in each of the three legal 
frameworks. Together, they form a landscape with two broad deficiencies: 
inaccessibility and uncertainty. These weaknesses increase the costs of reporting 
misconduct and therefore tilt the balance of incentives against whistleblowing. 
In the event that whistleblowers do proceed with their reports, the obstacles and 




Whistleblower protections can encourage reporting only if they are 
known and navigable by employees. As the Theranos case study demonstrates, 
workers are often unaware of their whistleblowing rights or how to vindicate 
them. This is unsurprising, as the law entails little notice and much complexity. 
 
mechanisms include affirmative reporting duties, penalties for non-reporting, and monetary awards for reporting. 
Feldman and Yuval distill this spectrum to the shorthand of “protect, command, fine, pay.” Id. at 1157. 
 258. Id. at 1176. In a series of experiments, Feldman and Lobel found that where the intrinsic motivation is 
high and protection is assured, other extrinsic incentives do not increase reporting levels. Id. at 1192–95. They 
also found that women are much more motivated by the presence or absence of legal protection than men, who 
are more motivated by rewards. Id. at 1196–97. Interestingly, they found that the insertion of extrinsic incentives 
such as penalties or awards “may undermine the likelihood that misconduct will be reported by producing a 
crowding-out effect in which the presence of external rewards dilutes the moral dimension of the act.” Id. at 
1174–75 (citing On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs Law & 
Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2109 (2008)). Indeed, awards may even carry a stigma. Id. at 1205. 
 259. Id. at 1183–84. 
 260. Id. 
 261. See Christina Orsini Broderick, Qui Tam Provisions & The Public Interest: An Empirical Analysis, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 949, 975 (2007) (inferring from the 73% dismissal rate of qui tam actions that a significant 
portion are frivolous). 
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First, workers do not receive effective notice of their rights. Although 
California’s anti-retaliation statute requires employers to post a notice of 
whistleblower rights, Cheung and Shultz were unaware of them. It appears that 
Theranos either did not comply with the notice requirement, posted the notice in 
a location where it escaped attention, or that this is simply not an effective way 
to raise awareness. In the trade secrets domain, the DTSA requires companies to 
include a whistleblower notice in any contract that addresses the confidentiality 
of trade secrets. Failure to do so precludes certain damages and attorneys’ fees. 
While this is a welcome measure, gaps remain: the DTSA does not require 
employers to make the notice conspicuous or in plain English, or provide 
workers with a copy for future reference. Moreover, the notice only needs to 
cover trade secrets and not the myriad other information protected by NDAs. 
With respect to this other proprietary information, employees receive no notice 
of any potential exceptions to the NDA. 
Second, many whistleblower protections require workers to exercise a 
degree of legal awareness and judgment that may not be realistic. Many anti-
retaliation statutes only protect employees who “reasonably believe” their report 
reveals a legal violation. Even the statutes with less demanding standards, such 
as “suspect” or “believe in good faith,” effectively require that employees 
contemplate the legality of the employer’s conduct, when in reality they may be 
concerned about violations of internal policies, professional standards, industry 
best practice, or simple common sense. It is not clear, for example, that Cheung 
and Shultz believed Theranos was violating the law when they first raised 
concerns internally. Ultimately, they demonstrated an unusual level of tenacity 
and initiative, researching proficiency testing rules.262 This is not a realistic 
expectation of the average worker. 
Third, the legal landscape for whistleblowers, with its many piecemeal, 
inconsistent, and overlapping provisions, is simply too complex for most non-
attorneys to navigate successfully on their own. To secure protection, a 
whistleblower must incur the transaction costs of identifying each liability risk, 
determining whether it has whistleblower protections, and satisfying all 
applicable standards and reporting protocols. When legal frameworks become 
too complex, the cost of deciphering the complexity may exceed the benefits of 
compliance. 263 At that point, an actor can either abandon the regulated activity 
or abandon the legal safe harbor.264 A prospective whistleblower who is 
confounded by the legal patchwork will likely refrain from whistleblowing or 
blow the whistle in an unprotected manner. 
One remedy for inaccessible laws is to consult counsel. This presents a 
chicken-or-egg dilemma, though, since workers are unlikely to proactively seek 
an attorney’s assistance unless they are already aware of the existence of 
whistleblower protections. In the Theranos case, Cheung sought an attorney only 
 
 262. CARREYROU, supra note 3, at 194. 
 263. Adam I. Muchmore, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Regulatory Design, 53 HOUSTON L. REV. 1321, 
1335-37 (2016). 
 264. Id. at 1337. 
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after exposing herself to legal liability by speaking to a reporter.265 Moreover, 
consulting counsel does not ensure sound legal advice on whistleblower laws. 
Cheung was unique among the Theranos whistleblowers to find an attorney who 
advised her at no cost and understood the relevant laws. Tyler Shultz initially 
sought advice from his grandfather’s estate attorney, who later referred him to a 
boutique firm specializing in business disputes. He ultimately accumulated over 
$400,000 in legal bills, but remained “completely unaware” of whistleblower 
protections.266 The pseudonymous lab director “Alan Beam” unsuccessfully 
tried to contact a boutique whistleblower firm before, in desperation, paying a 
retainer to the first attorney who appeared in his internet search. 267 That lawyer’s 
expertise was in medical malpractice and personal injury law.268 Rather than 
advise Beam on avenues for whistleblowing, she recommended that he 
acquiesce to Boies Schiller demands by deleting evidence of Theranos 
wrongdoing from his computer.269 Finally, if consulting counsel is effectively 
required to secure whistleblower protections, this strongly disadvantages the 




Even if a whistleblower ascertains their rights in advance, their path 
forward is laden with uncertainties. The importance of legal certainty depends 
on the purpose and context of the law.271 When a law is designed to 
disincentivize undesirable behavior, setting precise limits can encourage people 
to venture very close to that limit without fear of enforcement.272 It can also 
 
 265. Erika Cheung, A Journey to Speaking Truth in Power, TEDXBERKELEY, 
https://www.ted.com/talks/erika_cheung_a_journey_to_speaking_truth_in_power/transcript?language=en (last 
visited July 31, 2021). 
 266. CARREYROU, supra note 3, at 245; Id. at 287 (describing the toll of the legal threats on Shultz’s family); 
Stephen Kurczy, Lessons from the Theranos Whistleblower, COLUM. BUS. SCH. (Apr. 8, 2019), 
https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/articles/ideas-work/lessons-theranos-whistleblower (“There actually are a lot of 
protections for whistleblowers that I was completely unaware of when I was doing all this.”). 
 267. CARREYROU, supra note 3, at 214, 217. 
 268. Id. at 217. 
 269. Id. at 217–18. 
 270. A 2017 survey indicated that 86% of the time low-income Americans receive inadequate or no 
professional help for civil legal problems. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE 
UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 30 (June 2017), https://www.lsc.gov/ 
sites/default/files/images/TheJusticeGap-FullReport.pdf. 
 271. Yuval Feldman & Shahar Lifshitz, Behind the Veil of Legal Uncertainty, 74-SPG LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 133, 133 (2011); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1919 (1998) (“In corporate law, business planning needs render legal determinacy 
vital.”). Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Antonin Scalia were vocal advocates for greater certainty in law. 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 127 (1881) (“[T]he tendency of the law must always be to 
narrow the field of uncertainty.”); Antonin Scalia, The Rules of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 
1179 (1989) (“Predictability…is a needful characteristic of any law worthy of the name. There are times when 
even a bad rule is better than no rule at all.”). 
 272. Muchmore, supra note 263, at 1360. 
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facilitate the exploitation of loopholes.273 Conversely, a law intended to 
encourage desirable behavior may do so more effectively when the incentives 
are clear and reliable. Whistleblower protections are principally designed to 
encourage whistleblowing by reducing the associated risk ex ante. In this 
context, uncertainty impedes risk reduction and therefore subverts the purpose 
of the law. 
The whistleblower landscape produces several types of uncertainty. The 
first type of uncertainty arises when different legal frameworks intersect. The 
nonretaliation, trade secrets, and contract laws exist in parallel silos. 
Antiretaliation statutes do not expressly shield whistleblowers from liability. 
The DTSA only shields whistleblowers from liability under trade secrets laws. 
With respect to contracts, the public policy doctrine provides a tool to navigate 
tensions between NDAs and whistleblower protections, but its contours are 
uncertain. Because these frameworks are not harmonized, a whistleblower may 
need to satisfy different and potentially conflicting standards to secure 
protection. 
The second type of uncertainty arises in the process of vindicating 
whistleblower protections. The duration, costs, and outcomes are not sufficiently 
predictable to provide reassurance. Courts and administrative agencies generally 
interpret nonretaliation laws narrowly and unfavorably to employees. The 
DTSA suffers from a language ambiguity,274 labeling its whistleblower 
provision an “immunity” but not specifying the procedural implications of that 
term. Without a clear directive, courts have thus far defaulted to treating the 
provision as an affirmative defense, much to the detriment of whistleblowers 
who cannot have cases dismissed at the pleadings stage. Finally, courts are far 
from uniform in their approach to public policy defenses against NDA 
enforcement. The outcome of a contract enforcement action may depend on the 
nature of the misconduct, the scope of the disclosure, and the particular court’s 
disposition towards policy arguments. In sum, even whistleblowers who are 
informed of their rights may face lengthy, costly, and uncertain litigation. 
A third type of uncertainty comes from the use of standards instead of rules 
in the whistleblower laws.275 Standards require ex post examination of the 
circumstances, whereas rules are determinable ex ante.276 In practice, these poles 
are situated on a spectrum rather than discrete categories.277 In the whistleblower 
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context, many statutes only protect reporters who “reasonably believe” they are 
reporting a legal violation. 278 Such standards make whistleblowers vulnerable 
to courts that may decide their belief was unreasonable. Unfortunately, it may 
not be feasible to eliminate this uncertainty. A more objective rule could entail 
protecting all reports, but this would facilitate frivolous or false accusations. 
Alternatively, a more objective rule could require an actual violation of law, but 
this would put the burden on workers to exercise legal judgment before 
reporting. Given the downsides to making the standards more rule-like, it may 
suffice to make the standards more favorable to whistleblowers. A “good faith 
belief” or “suspected” standard is more forgiving than a reasonableness 
standard. They also provide more certainty, since whistleblowers have more 
insight into their own mental state than they have knowledge of the law. 
In light of the weaknesses explored above, the following Subpart offers 
principles for a legal framework that will more effectively facilitate 
whistleblowing. 
C. AN AGENDA FOR REFORM 
 
The weaknesses detailed above militate for reform to improve the 
accessibility and certainty of whistleblower protections. This Subpart highlights 
features that will reduce the costs of whistleblowing and thus encourage reports 
of misconduct. They do not comprise an exhaustive blueprint, but a starting point 
to remediate certain weaknesses that emerge from the Theranos case study and 
examination of the legal landscape. 
Harmonized Minimum Protections. The patchwork of legal protections 
creates unnecessary complexity and risks for potential whistleblowers. The 
simplest and most effective way to address this weakness is by harmonizing 
minimum protections into a single federal statute that expressly inoculates 
private sector whistleblowers from both retaliation and all forms of liability, 
including contractual, tort, and statutory liability. This would provide 
prospective whistleblowers with more reliable protection and a single, 
accessible path to protected disclosure. State and federal policymakers could, of 
course, offer enhanced protections and rewards for specific legal violations that 
they deem to be especially pernicious. 
Swift Path to Dismissal of Claims. Current law subjects whistleblowers 
to the prospect of lengthy and expensive litigation. To mitigate this problem, 
Professor Menell intended and advocated for the DTSA’s whistleblower 
protection to be treated as an immunity rather than an affirmative defense. Such 
an interpretation would curtail legal actions initiated against whistleblowers for 
the purpose of intimidation or deterrence. It would also help to assure 
whistleblowers that any litigation could be concluded with relative speed. Given 
the courts’ failure to interpret the provision as intended, a harmonized statute 
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should explicate the procedural implications of immunity with greater 
specificity. 
Forgiving Standard. Knowledge of the law and access to legal counsel 
are significant barriers to protected whistleblowing. A harmonized statute 
should recognize this reality by minimizing the burden of legal knowledge on 
the part of whistleblowers. This means covering information that the worker 
“believes in good faith” or “suspects” constitutes a violation of any federal, state, 
or local law or regulation, or a danger to the health and safety of employees or 
the public. 
Effective Notice. To facilitate whistleblowing through official channels 
and minimize employer intimidation, the law must mandate effective 
notification to workers of their rights. Here, the DTSA and SEC rules provide 
instructive but incomplete models. Employers should be required to provide 
written notice of whistleblower protections to all workers, in plain language 
mandated by law. Such language should make clear that whistleblower 
protections override any other contractual commitments or duties to the 
company. As under the DTSA, failure to provide such notice should reduce the 
employer’s right to damages under any theory of law for acquisition, use, or 
disclosure of its otherwise protectable information. 
There is probably an absolute limit to the effectiveness of any written 
notice. Studies have repeatedly shown that the public often does not read, 
understand, and/or use the information contained in mandated disclosures.279 
This is true even of disclosures designed to be simple, like nutrition labels.280 
Professors Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider attribute the failure of 
mandated disclosures to an “overload effect” (disclosures are far too long and 
technical for people to understand) and an “accumulation problem” (disclosures 
are too ubiquitous in American life for people to engage with them 
meaningfully).281 That said, a prospective whistleblower concerned about 
liability risk is probably more likely than the average employee to consult the 
language of their NDA. To the extent that notice can make a marginal difference 
in employees’ awareness of their whistleblower rights, it remains worthwhile. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The rise and fall of Theranos offers insights and critical lessons regarding 
the legal treatment of whistleblowers. The woman who triggered the first 
regulatory response to Theranos’s dangerous and unlawful practices contended 
with an unfavorable internal and external environment, from the company’s 
repressive and unethical culture, to an uncertain and inaccessible web of legal 
protections. 
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Erika Cheung’s experience illuminates shortcomings in the whistleblower 
legal regime that needlessly expose whistleblowers to liability and deter reports 
of misconduct. These shortcomings create individual, institutional, and public 
costs. All three Theranos whistleblowers endured legal threats and professional 
dislocation, and two incurred substantial financial losses. The delay in 
actionable reports also spelled disaster for the company’s stakeholders. While 
bankruptcy was likely inevitable, earlier exposure could have spared investor 
capital. Finally, the public was unnecessarily subjected to the risk of faulty blood 
tests. 
The Theranos case study should prompt consideration of a harmonized 
legal framework that will increase the certainty and accessibility of 
whistleblower protection. In a culture that valorizes dynamic startups and 
founders who promise to change the world, Theranos is a reminder of the 
importance of empowering the workers with the levers of accountability. 
 
